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ANTECEDENTS AND OUTCOMES OF THE INVESTMENT IN INTERNAL 
AUDITING AND THE MODERATING ROLE OF FAMILY BUSINESS CULTURE 
 
          Summary of Research 
Despite the recent attention and the apparent benefits of the internal auditing 
function (IAF), the antecedents that lead a company to voluntarily invest in an IAF are 
relatively little understood.  Further, there is little research focused on the outcomes of 
the investment in an IAF.  In addition, most IAF research that has been conducted so far 
has focused on large, publicly traded firms.  However, privately held family businesses 
are the major contributors to economic wealth and job creation in the United States.  This 
segment of the business environment provides a new and important context in which to 
investigate the antecedents and outcomes of the investment in an IAF.  Another critical 
aspect lacking research is the impact of the culture of the family on the existence of an 
IAF.  The blending of family culture with organizational culture in the family business is 
a key aspect that is not only different from nonfamily businesses, but also differs across 
family businesses.  Both essays include family business culture as a moderating variable 
to provide a more detailed analysis of the differences between family businesses, as 
opposed to dichotomously comparing family businesses to nonfamily businesses.   
ESSAY #1: Family Involvement, the Internal Auditing Function, and the 
   Moderating Role of Family Business Culture





Essay #1 extends agency theory into the area of the IAF in privately held family 
businesses.  The study examines the level of family involvement in ownership, top 
management, and on the board of directors as antecedents to the existence of an IAF.  
There are anticipated to be unique family and/or business characteristics and dynamics 
that will likely result in differences as to the existence of an IAF at a business.  However, 
the identification and understanding of these differences is limited in extant literature.  A 
negative relationship is hypothesized between each of the family involvement variables 
and the existence of an IAF.  In addition, the strength of the negative relationship is 
anticipated to strengthen as family business culture increases.  This study provides 
privately held family businesses with information that can be used to evaluate their 
decision of whether or not to have an IAF, relative to the same decision in other family 
businesses.  Also, the study provides additional research results to the ongoing 
controversy of agency costs in family businesses.   
ESSAY #2: Investment in Internal Auditing, Family Business Outcomes, and the 
                        Moderating Role of Family Business Culture 
Essay #2 extends the knowledge of the existence of an IAF gained in Essay #1 to 
examine the relationship between different levels of investment in an IAF and family 
business outcomes associated with the investment.  While research has indicated that 
investment in an IAF leads to beneficial outcomes in publicly traded companies, it 
remains an open question as to what outcomes might exist in privately held family 
businesses.  Several dimensions of family business outcomes are explored:  (1) objective 
and subjective financial performance, (2) trust in the business and in trust in top 
management, and (3) affective commitment.  An integration of two theories provides the 





theoretical foundation for this study.  An agency theory framework is used to examine the 
relationship between the investment in an IAF and financial performance.  Social 
exchange theory is used to investigate potential impacts of the investment in an IAF on 
trust in the business, trust in top management, and affective commitment.  A positive 
relationship is posited between the investment in an IAF and the outcome measures.  In 
addition, the strength of the positive relationships is anticipated to weaken as family 
culture increases.   
This research contributes to a better understanding of the outcomes of an IAF in 
privately held family businesses, which are more prototypical of the prevalent type of 
business in the United States and most areas of the world, unlike the large publicly traded 
firms usually used in this type of research.   
An electronic survey was developed to collect the data for both studies.  The 
survey was completed by the Chief Financial Officer (or individual in an equivalent 
position) of the business. 




FAMILY INVOLVEMENT, THE INTERNAL AUDITING FUNCTION 
AND THE MODERATING ROLE OF FAMILY BUSINESS CULTURE 
          
          ABSTRACT 
 This essay extends agency theory into the area of privately held family businesses 
to add to the extant, conflicting research concerning family involvement and related 
agency costs.  This research examines three unique characteristics of privately held 
family businesses that could influence the existence of an internal auditing function 
(IAF); family involvement in ownership, in top management and on the board.  Statistical 
significance was identified in the association with family involvement on the board and 
the existence of an IAF, however the association was positive as opposed to negative.  
The study also develops a family business culture construct and investigates the potential 
moderating effect of the construct in these relationships.  Results indicate that the control 
variables of the existence of an audit committee and having an external audit conducted 
within the last two fiscal years have more influence than family involvement on the 
existence of an IAF.  In addition, family business culture was not determined to moderate 
the relationships between family involvement in these three unique areas of family 
businesses and the existence of an IAF.  This research is the first step in gaining more 
knowledge of the influence of family involvement and the impact of that influence on the 
desire for a governance mechanism, such as an IAF. 






The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, 1999) defines internal auditing as, “An 
independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and 
improve an organization’s operations.  It helps an organization accomplish its objectives 
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness 
of risk management, control, and governance processes.”  Since 2001 and the highly 
publicized financial reporting fraud cases of companies such as Enron and WorldCom, 
the internal auditing function (IAF) has increased in prominence.  One lesson to be 
learned from these publicized company collapses is that knowledge of a company’s 
culture, operations, and risk profile is essential to company success and longevity (IIA, 
2010).   
The primary role of the IAF is to provide this crucial information to an 
organization and those with oversight responsibility and therefore represents a valuable 
resource for the business (IIA, 2010).  Beginning in 2004, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) requires all listed companies to have an IAF (Harrington, 2004).  Also, the 
NASDAQ stock exchange encourages an IAF as a best practice (Harrington, 2004), 
further emphasizing the importance of the function.  In addition, the implementation of 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has resulted in companies placing more emphasis 
on internal controls and the internal auditing function (Prawitt, Smith, & Wood, 2009).   
 Despite the recent attention and apparent benefits of an IAF, the factors leading a 
company to decide to voluntarily invest in an IAF are little understood (Anderson, Christ, 
Johnstone, & Rittenbery, 2012; Barua, Rama, & Sharma, 2010; Carcello, Hermanson, & 
Raghunandan, 2005; Carey, Simnett, & Tanewski, 2000; Debicki, Matherne III, 





Kellermanns, & Chrisman, 2009; Trotman & Trotman, 2010).  Carey et al. (2000) 
examined factors associated with the existence of external and internal audits in family 
businesses in Australia.  The research revealed that internal audit was more prevalent 
than external audit.  The agency variables of the proportion of nonfamily management 
and the proportion of nonfamily board member provided support for the existence of 
external audit, but not for the existence of internal audit (Carey et al. 2000) leaving 
unanswered questions related to family involvement. 
While there has been some research on large, publicly traded companies, the 
antecedents leading a privately held business, particularly a privately held family 
business, to invest in an IAF have not been examined in great detail.  This gap in our 
current understanding is problematic given that family businesses play a leading role in 
global economic production and employment, totaling 65 to 80 percent of businesses 
worldwide (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; IFERA, 2003; Mandl, 2008).  Research 
in the United States has shown that family businesses generate approximately 60% of the 
country’s employment (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003) and account for 50% of gross 
domestic product and 78% of  new job creation (Perman, 2006). 
Privately held family businesses represent a new and important context in which 
to investigate the IAF.  Even though privately held family businesses are not required to 
have an IAF, some make the decision to invest in the function.  It is anticipated that 
differences in the decision are due to unique family and/or businesses characteristics.  
However, the identification and understanding of these characteristics as antecedents to 
the decision to invest in an IAF is limited in extant literature.  This study examines three 
unique family involvement characteristics of privately held family businesses – namely, 





family involvement in ownership, in top management, and on the board of directors – as 
antecedents that are posited to influence the existence of an IAF, while controlling for 
agency related variables found to be significant predictors in prior research.   
Kotter & Heskett (1992) suggest that culture refers to values (i.e., what is 
considered important) that are shared by members of a group and tend to persist over 
time, even when the members of the group change.  Family businesses are in a unique 
situation of combining the culture of the family with the culture of the organization 
(business).  Family culture exerts powerful influences over what family business 
members do and how they interpret and respond to environmental challenges (Zahra, 
Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008).   
Prior literature has suggested both positive (Denison, Lief, & Ward, 2004; Miller 
& Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Zahra et al. 2008) and negative (Burkart et al. 2003; Gomez-
Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001) 
consequences from family involvement in the business.  The conflicting results from 
prior research related to family involvement could be due to the potential moderating 
effect of the unique culture of the family, a variable often overlooked in research (Dyer, 
2003; Vallejo, 2011).  The nature of family culture may create advantages by providing a 
highly committed workforce with shared goals and values (Dyer, 2003).   
Therefore, it is suggested that family business research, where findings are apt to 
be influenced by variations in goals, core values, and relationships, should include the 
culture of the family among the variables of interest (Dyer, 2003; Vallejo, 2011).  The 
shared histories and identities of the family provide a foundation of core values and 
standards of behavior that have potentially led to conflicting prior research results.  In the 





context of this study, the culture of the family is anticipated to strengthen the relationship 
between family involvement in the business and the existence of an IAF resulting in 
family businesses making different decisions as to whether to invest in an IAF function. 
This research combines the culture of the family with the culture of the 
organization (business) to form a single variable titled family business culture.  Inclusion 
of family business culture in the study will enable the analysis of how different levels of 
culture affect the strength of the relationship between family involvement and the 
existence of an IAF.  Denison et al. (2004, p. 63) state of family firms, “this cultural 
uniqueness, if understood and nurtured, can be one of a corporation’s greatest 
advantages.”   
Agency theory has provided a framework for prior research related to the IAF 
(Adams, 1994; Carcello et al. 2005; Carey et al. 2000; Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991) and 
will be used here as well.  Jensen & Meckling (1976) posited that agency costs do not 
apply when a wholly owned firm is managed by the owner because the owner will make 
decisions that maximize the utility of the business and the owner.  However, within the 
complex environment of family businesses there have been conflicting research results 
using the Jensen & Meckling (1976) view.  Research results have indicated that family 
involvement actually creates situations of agency costs rather than negating them 
(Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b; Schulze et al. 
2001).  On the other side of the debate, researchers have found evidence that family 
involvement allows leaders to be freer and more motivated to act for the good of the 
organization and its clients in the long run (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Hoopes & 
Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003; Ouchi, 1980).   





Agency theory suggests that varying combinations of family involvement in the 
key areas of ownership, management, and the board of directors would result in varying 
levels of the desire for governance processes, such as the existence of an IAF (Carey et 
al. 2000).  However, this proposition has not been empirically tested in privately held 
family businesses (Salvato & Moores, 2010; Trotman & Trotman, 2010), as prior 
research has frequently neglected family dynamics when studying family businesses 
(Dyer, 2003; Vallejo, 2011).  This neglect has resulted in extant literature not providing 
an analysis of the potential moderating effect of family culture related to governance 
mechanisms, such as the decision to invest in an IAF.     
This study analyzes the relationships between three aspects of family involvement 
in the business and the existence of an IAF and investigates how family business culture 
moderates the strength of these relationships.  By extending agency theory into the area 
of the IAF in privately held family businesses, several gaps in the literature will be 
addressed.  First, as recommended by Astrachan (2010), Trotman & Trotman (2010), 
Debicki et al. (2009), and Carey et al. (2000), this study will investigate if less separation 
between ownership and management results in less likelihood of the existence of an IAF, 
as is predicted by agency theory.  Second, the study will use the unique element of family 
business culture as a moderator to examine more closely the dynamics within and across 
privately held family businesses.  This approach extends prior research, as the majority of 
extant research has compared family businesses to nonfamily businesses (Allouche, 
Amann, Jaussaud, & Kurashina, 2008; Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Sharma, 2004).  Finally, the research will 
provide privately held family businesses with previously unavailable information 





concerning the decision to invest in an IAF for various levels of family involvement and 
family business culture. 
The remainder of the paper is composed of three sections.  The next section 
provides the background, reviews the relevant literature, and develops the hypotheses.  
The following section describes the research methods to be employed, details of the data 
collection, analysis processes, and the results.  The final section discusses the 
implications of the results, the limitations of the study and provides recommendations for 
future research.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The Internal Auditing Function 
Recent studies have consistently found that the IAF can have a positive influence 
on corporate governance, including reporting quality and firm performance (Gramling, 
Maletta, Schneider, & Church, 2004).  While the corporate collapses of the past and 
subsequent requirements for an IAF mentioned earlier are related to publicly traded 
companies, one lesson to be learned for all businesses is that knowledge of a company’s 
culture, operations, and risk profile is essential to company success and longevity (IIA, 
2010).  The primary role of the IAF is to provide this crucial information to an 
organization and those with oversight responsibilities, and therefore the IAF represents a 
valuable resource for the business (IIA, 2010).  Presumably these benefits would extend 
to family businesses. 
  Despite all the recent attention and benefits of the IAF, extant research on factors 
influencing a business’s decision to invest in an IAF is scarce (Anderson et al. 2012; 





Barua et al. 2010; Carcello et al. 2005; Carey et al. 2000; Debicki et al. 2009; Trotman & 
Trotman, 2010).  Prior research has focused primarily on the factors associated with the 
existence or size (measured by the number of internal auditing staff) of the IAF (Carey et 
al. 2000; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006).  Carcello et al. (2005)  is the only study to 
examine factors associated with the investment in an IAF.  Carcello et al. (2005) analyzed 
the internal auditing budgets for a sample of 217 mid-sized U.S. public companies.  The 
authors found evidence that internal audit budgets are positively related to several 
antecedents including company risk, the ability to pay for monitoring, and specific 
characteristics of the audit mechanisms (i.e., internal audit budget review by the audit 
committee, amount of outsourcing of the IAF, and the relationship with external audit 
fees).  
 While little is known about the role of the IAF in privately held family businesses, 
the following situations offer opportunities for benefits from investing in an IAF.  For 
example, the desire to employ a family member may result in hiring an employee lacking 
the appropriate skill set for the position (Dyer, 1986).  A quality IAF could assist in these 
situations by ensuring that management understands and appropriately mitigates risks 
related to this adverse selection.  Also, if family involvement decreases or ownership 
becomes more dispersed, agency theory suggests that some form of agency costs will be 
incurred.  Daily & Dollinger (1992) found that the desire to maintain close control leads 
family businesses to use significantly fewer formal internal control systems, instead 
opting for more social methods of control.  Unlike an external auditing function, the IAF 
allows the family business to provide an auditing function and keep the family business 
information inside the business. 





Agency Theory   
While extant literature on agency theory is vast, this review of the theory will be 
limited to the IAF and situations of ownership and management in family businesses.  
Agency theory has provided a framework for most prior research related to the 
investment in an IAF (Adams, 1994; Carcello et al. 2005; Carey et al. 2000; Wallace & 
Kreutzfeldt, 1991).  Studies in various countries around the world including Hong Kong 
(Ng, 2005), Indonesia (Achmad, Neilson, & Tower, 2009), Australia (Bartholomeusz & 
Tanewski, 2006), Lebanon (Fahed-Sreih & Djoundourian, 2006), Germany (Pieper, 
Klein, & Jaskiewicz, 2008), and the United States (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Daily & 
Dollinger, 1992; James, 1999b; Wang, 2006) have linked family business ownership and 
governance structure to agency issues and performance.   
Jensen & Meckling (1976) state that firms are merely a series of complex 
contractual relationships between various stakeholders.  An agency relationship occurs 
when the principal (usually the owner) contracts with another party, known as the agent 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The contract involves the principal delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent.  This delegation makes it possible for the agent to 
have more information and the opportunity to implement decisions that could benefit the 
agent but contribute to the detriment of the business and the owner (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).   
Agency theory is based on the premise that principals have less information than 
agents, and this fact adversely affects the principals’ ability to monitor effectively if, in 
fact, the agents are appropriately serving the interests of the principals (Adams, 1994).  
This gap widens as more agents assume decision-making roles.  In response to this threat, 





the principal often imposes some form of monitoring device(s), which is implemented 
and maintained at a cost, therefore incurring agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Jensen & Meckling (1976, p. 308) define agency costs as the sum of: “(1) the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures of the agent, and (3) the 
residual loss.” 
In addition, Jensen & Meckling (1976) posited that agency costs do not apply 
when a wholly owned firm is managed by the owner because the owner will make 
decisions that maximize the utility of the business and the owner.  However, within the 
complex environment of family businesses, extant research does not always support the 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) view.  Research results have indicated that family 
involvement actually creates situations of agency costs rather than negating them 
(Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Schulze et al. 2003b; Schulze et al. 2001).   
On the other side of the debate, researchers have found evidence that family 
involvement allows leaders to be freer and more motivated to act for the good of the 
organization and its clients in the long run (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Hoopes & 
Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003; Ouchi, 1980).  Opposing research 
findings could point to a potential moderator impacting the strength of the relationship 
between family involvement and various outcomes.  This research posits that family 
business culture has the potential to impact the findings across family businesses, 
producing varying research results.  However, extant research examining this potential 
moderator in privately held family businesses is limited. 
 Privately held firms do not have the disciplinary mechanism of public stock 
markets and share trading prices to provide feedback related to firm performance 





(Schulze et al. 2001).  The lack of these external monitoring mechanisms results in these 
firms having heightened exposure to problems created by owners who have the 
opportunity to harm themselves and the ones around them (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 
2002).  Two types of agency problems in family business can be distinguished.  Type I 
agency problems arise from the separation of ownership and management.  Family firms 
face less severe Type I agency problems because of the ability of the owners to directly 
monitor managers (Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  Type II agency problems occur when a majority shareholder 
uses his/her controlling position in the business to expropriate benefits at the expense of 
minority owners.  Because of the family’s significant ownership and control over the 
board of directors, family businesses often face more severe Type II agency problems 
(Ali et al. 2007; Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).     
 Prior research has also examined agency issues in the two categories of adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Chrisman et al. 2004; Schulze et al. 2001).  Adverse 
selection occurs when the principal contracts with an agent who does not have the 
appropriate skill, commitment, motivation, or ethics to fulfill the responsibilities of the 
position.  To control for this issue principals need to incur higher search and verification 
costs (Chrisman et al. 2004).  Moral hazard involves the commission or omission of 
actions that benefit the agent at the detriment of the principal (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001; 
Schulze et al. 2001).  Issues of adverse selection and moral hazard result in the need for 
principals to use a combination of incentives, punishments, bonding, and managerial 
processes to ensure alignment of interests with the agent and to monitor the agents’ 
actions (Chrisman et al. 2004).  Chrisman et al. (2004) refer to the processes, systems, 





and structures, set up for the purpose of monitoring and aligning interests as agency cost 
control mechanisms.  The IAF serves the role of such a control mechanism.    
Family Involvement 
In Ownership  
For the purposes of this research family involvement in ownership is measured in 
percentages from 0 to 100.  This allows the research to examine family involvement on a 
continuous scale and between family businesses, rather than dichotomously 
distinguishing between family and nonfamily firms (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 
2002).  The differing levels of family involvement in ownership will increase the 
variability in the research results and also allow for analyses across family businesses. 
Given their private ownership structure, the family businesses utilized in this 
research are free from the scrutiny and discipline imposed by capital markets.  Because 
the majority of privately held family businesses operate outside of standard capital 
markets and consequently outside of the standard markets for corporate control, external 
governance cannot limit forms of owner opportunism (Schulze et al. 2001).   
However, owners of a privately held family business who are not actively 
involved in the business need to have confidence that management is capable of running 
the business and adapting to changing business and environmental situations so that the 
business can succeed (Sundaramurthy, 2008).  Owners of a privately held family business 
have incentives to adopt and enforce governance practices to prevent self-control 
problems of other owners and management from undermining the viability of the firm 
(Schulze et al. 2001).  Shleifer & Vishny (1997) suggest large, unaffiliated (non-family) 
owners have strong incentives to monitor managers.  As the percentage of owners not 





involved in the business increases, there is a growing concern that the managers could 
depart from maximizing shareholder wealth (Chow, 1982) and instead pursue self-
interested goals.  The increase of owners not involved in the business could be the result 
of the need to raise capital from outside the business which could diversify ownership 
(Carey et al. 2000).  The increase of uninvolved owners could also occur due to the death 
of an involved owner who has deeded his/her ownership to a less involved individual.   
In addition, as family members retire or subsequent generations are not interested 
in pursuing the family business, the business may move closer to a market model of 
fewer active family members, resulting in the need for appropriate control mechanisms to 
sustain the business (Lane, Astrachan, Keyt, & McMillan, 2006).  An IAF can provide 
monitoring and therefore transparency to any potential bias in management’s decision 
making (Prawitt et al. 2009).   
Based on agency theory the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1:  The percentage of business ownership held by members of the owning 
         family will be negatively related to the existence of an IAF 
In Top Management   
  In a study of Spanish newspapers over a 27 year period, Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2001) found that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable 
when the CEO being replaced was a member of the family owning the firm.  The 
implication is that family business owners are less willing to monitor and discipline 
family CEOs.  Reluctance to monitor and discipline family members can result in 
managerial entrenchment where family managers remain in their positions even though 
they are no longer effective (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001).  When managerial entrenchment 





occurs, the possibility exists that a professional outside manager would provide greater 
value to the family business.   
 Schulze et al. (2001) infer that agency problems may be more pronounced in 
family-managed firms due to self-control or other agency threats engendered by the 
unselfish concern for the welfare of others, such as altruism.  Schulze et al. (2001) 
conclude that it is essential that family-managed firms invest in similar internal control 
mechanisms as those that are deemed necessary for widely held firms.  In addition, 
research has shown that, in the act of self-preservation, managers will try to neutralize 
internal control mechanisms that might uncover any negative decisions (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990).  This could be especially true in the situation of entrenchment by a 
manager in a privately held family business (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001). 
 However, other research results are more in agreement with agency theory.  
Agency theory would suggest that a family CEO can possibly eliminate the Type I 
agency conflicts that could occur between owners and nonfamily managers (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) because of the 
ability of the owners to directly monitor managers.  In addition, family managers have 
been shown to reduce uncertainty about future cash flows and therefore have longer 
performance and investment horizons (James, 1999a; Laverty, 1996).  The following 
hypothesis is proposed:   
 H2:  The percentage of top management positions held by members of the              
          owning family will be negatively related to the existence of an IAF 
 
 





On the Board of Directors 
 Research has yielded conflicting results when examining the potential benefits of 
family versus nonfamily members on the board of directors.  Insider board members can 
provide rich firm-specific knowledge and strong commitment to the firm (Sundaramurthy 
& Lewis, 2003).   Bartholomeusz & Tanewski (2006) suggest that the mere presence of 
nonfamily owners on the board of directors creates tension that will ultimately result in 
reduced performance.  Lane et al. (2006) state that outsider board members can be 
influenced by financial incentives or recognition and therefore do not necessarily 
guarantee objectivity.  
 On the other hand, boards comprised primarily of insiders (current or former 
managers/employees of the firm) or dependent outsiders (directors who have business 
relationships with the firm and/or family or social ties with the CEO) may be perceived 
as less effective at monitoring others (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003).  Schwartz & 
Barnes (1991) argue that an active board of directors with nonfamily outsiders can offer 
access to information, expertise, and networks from outside the business.  Sundaramurthy 
(2008) states that including nonfamily members on the board of directors can assist 
family businesses in drawing boundaries between the family and business systems, 
enhance the quality of strategic decisions, provide a system of checks and balances, and 
provide access to competencies to compete in a changing market-place.   
 Outside board members are able to better monitor, discipline, and even dismiss 
managers since they are not beholden to the firm or the CEO for their livelihood 
(Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Walsh & Seward, 1990).  Well-governed family 
businesses exhibit higher overall levels of outsider representation on the board of 





directors than poorly governed family businesses (Schulze et al. 2001).  Based on the 
previous discussion, agency theory would suggest the following hypothesis: 
  H3:  The percentage of board positions held by members of the owning 
                      family will be negatively related to the existence of an IAF 
Family Business Culture 
Kotter & Heskett (1992) suggest that culture refers to values (what is considered 
important) that are shared by members of a group and tend to persist overtime, even when 
the members of the group change.  Family businesses are in a unique situation of 
combining the culture of the family with the culture of the organization.  For this 
research, the culture of the organization (business) was combined with the culture of the 
family to form a construct titled family business culture.  Prior to discussing the 
relevance of this new construct in the context of an IAF, each of the two constituting 
components is addressed separately in the following sections. 
Organizational Culture 
 Organizational culture has been defined in numerous ways.  However, a common 
theme is that organizational culture refers to a system of shared meaning held by 
organizational members that distinguishes the organization from all other organizations 
(Becker, 1982).  It may be viewed as “the pattern of shared values and beliefs that help 
individuals understand the organizational functioning and thus provide them with the 
norms for behavior in the organization” (Deshpande & Webster, 1989, p. 4).  The 
importance of values in organizational culture is fundamentally linked to the process of 
identity formation in which individuals seek a social connection and use this 
identification to define themselves (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  Past research has found 





that one key element of organizational culture is the person-organization fit in which 
aspects of both the individual and the situation combine to influence an individual’s 
response to a given situation (O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991).  When people 
belong to the same organization and share perceptions about beliefs and values, they tend 
to act in similar ways (Sorensen, 2002).  For example, characteristics of organizational 
culture, such as innovation and risk-taking, attention to detail, team orientation, stability, 
and outcome orientation, strongly influence employee behaviors (Chatman & Jehn, 1994; 
O'Reilly et al. 1991).   
 Strong organizational cultures exist when employees and management respond to 
situations because of their alignment with organizational values (Deal & Kennedy, 1982).  
Nemeth (1997) suggested that an unanticipated consequence of strong organizational 
culture companies is the stifling of employee creativity and innovation through an intense 
commitment to a set of ideas, a form of groupthink (Janis, 1972, 1982)  In addition, 
strong culture firms tend to excel at incremental change levels, but encounter difficulties 
in more volatile environments (Sorensen, 2002).   
 On the other hand, Deal & Kennedy (1982) state that strong organizational 
cultures can positively affect performance by instilling within employees a clear sense of 
purpose and expectation that can result in increased organizational commitment, 
employee motivation, and efficiency.  Also, one could assume the stronger an 
organizational culture, the less the need for internal controls such as an IAF.  This 
substitution could be the case because organizational culture reduces variability in 
performance, promotes a high level of commitment to an established way of 
understanding the world, and avoids the costs of disagreement surrounding organizational 





goals and the means to achieve them (Sorensen, 2002).  In a study of top performing 
companies, Peters & Waterman (1982) found that the stronger the culture, and the more 
directed at the marketplace, the less the need for policy manuals, organizational charts, or 
detailed procedures and rules.  “In these companies, people way down the line know what 
they are supposed to do in most situations because the handful of guiding values is crystal 
clear” (Peters & Waterman, 1982, pp. 75-76).   
Family Culture 
   Families vary greatly in their nature, composition, beliefs, and orientations, 
resulting in widely varying family cultures.  Family cultures exert powerful influences 
over what family business members do and how they interpret and respond to 
environmental challenges (Zahra et al. 2008).  Family culture serves as the foundation for 
the culture of the family business (Heck, 2004).  In addition, Dyer (1988) indicates that 
the culture of the family business plays an important role in whether the firm continues 
beyond the first generation.   
 Culture has been empirically shown to have a significant influence on key 
strategic decisions of family firms, i.e., promoting entrepreneurship and enhancing the 
distinctiveness of the firm’s products, goods, and services (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 
2004).  Vallejo (2008) conducted a comparative analysis of the culture of family 
businesses and nonfamily businesses in the automobile distributor sector in Spain.  The 
research results implied that family businesses have a stronger culture based on the fact 
that they present greater commitment, greater organizational harmony, and a more long-
term oriented management.     





 A number of prior studies have focused on the negative attributes of family 
culture on the family business.  Lack of professionalization (Hall & Nordqvist, 2008), 
non-reciprocal altruism (Schulze et al. 2002; Schulze et al. 2001), shirking (Gomez-Mejia 
et al. 2001; Schulze et al. 2001), over-concern with wealth preservation (Carney, 2005) 
and adverse selection (Burkart et al. 2003; Schulze et al. 2002) are a few of the issues that 
have been researched.   
 Contrasting research has identified numerous positive effects of family culture in 
the business.  Families with strong personal ties, and identifying more closely with the 
family business, create an environment enabling the firm to react to the environmental 
shifts, as opposed to being passive, stagnant, or risk-averse (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2006; Zahra et al. 2008).  Families have a devotion and passion for the business that 
stems more from substantive missions and values than desire for short-term profits 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003).  Employees of family businesses are often guided 
more by common values than by immediate pecuniary incentives or hierarchical controls 
(Ouchi, 1980).   
 “The literature shows consistently that family owned businesses are more value or 
culture driven, more concerned with indoctrination, more apt to be caring of and loyal to 
their employees, and more preoccupied with getting the full potential out of their staff” 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003, p. 130).  Miller & Le Breton-Miller (2003) continue 
by stating that being driven by values or culture helps establish a virtuous circle where 
employees sense they are in a reciprocal, encompassing relationship with the business.  
This allows mutual loyalty and commitment to grow.  Sharing common values, beliefs, 
and culture can provide the harmony of interests that reduces the potential of 





opportunistic behavior (Ouchi, 1980).  Auditing of performance is unnecessary in this 
condition, because no member will attempt to depart from organizational goals (Ouchi, 
1980).  In a case study of a second generation family business, McCollom (1988, p. 414) 
reported that “family ties were so strong that they allowed the business to continue to rely 
on informal coordination mechanisms even as the company grew rapidly.”  The above 
research results relating to the strength of the family business culture lead to the 
following hypotheses: 
H4:  Family business culture will moderate the negative relationship  
         between the percentage of business ownership held by members of the  
         owning family and the existence of an IAF such that the negative 
         relationship will strengthen as the level of family business culture  
         increases 
 H5:  Family business culture will moderate the negative relationship  
                     between the percentage of top management positions help by members  
                     of the owning family and the existence of an IAF such that the  
                     negative relationship will strengthen as the level of family business culture 
                     increases 
H6:  Family business culture will moderate the negative relationship  
         between the percentage of board positions held by members of the  
         owning family and the existence of an IAF such that the negative  
         relationship will strengthen as the level of family business culture  
         increases 
Figure 1 displays the conceptual model operationalized. 





















Family Business Culture 
Second-Order Factor Analysis (16 items) 
a) F-PEC Culture Subscale  
b) Denison Organizational Culture Survey 
 
 
Family Involvement in Ownership 
F-PEC Power Subscale (4 items) 
Family Involvement in Top 
Management 
Number of positions and number 
that are held by family (2 items) 
 
 Family Involvement on the Board 
of Directors 
F-PEC Power Subscale (2 items) 
 
 
Existence of an IAF 
Yes or No 
 
















Sample and Data Collection 
 This research uses primary data collected via an electronic survey.  The use of 
surveys is consistent with prior studies investigating family businesses (Chrisman, 
Gatewood, & Donlevy, 2002; Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008; Schulze, 
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a).  The survey was pretested utilizing family businesses that 
were members of a family business center in the southeastern region of the United States.  
The pretest provided the opportunity to verify the appropriateness and clarity of the 
approach and the questions in the survey (Hair, Money, Samouel, & Page, 2007).  The 
pretest participants’ feedback was also used to determine the appropriate ranges and 
scales for the responses.   
 It remains extremely challenging to gather financial or business process 
information from privately held family businesses (Handler, 1989).  There are no public 
disclosure requirements for these businesses, resulting in the nonexistence of secondary 
or archival data.  In addition, privacy and confidentially of their information is a high 
priority to these businesses.  For these reasons, a private research company was retained  
to gather the responses.  Qualtrics (Clear Voice Research), a 100% market research only 
panel, with census representation to reach hard to source groups, was utilized to gather 
the responses from their panel members.  This company and method of using panel data 
has been utilized in prior academic research (Strauss, Griffin, & Parker, in press). 
 The company has approximately 540,000 panelists who respond at an average rate 
of 20%.  When the requested respondent pool is a hard-to-reach segment, this company 
employs partnerships with other companies to reach the desired respondents, as was the 





case with the sample for this survey.  Several checks are in place to confirm the identity 
of respondents including: (1) verification of all postal addresses, (2) the use of flash 
cookies, and (3) the tracking of internet protocol (IP) addresses.  In addition, the 
company pulls a sample in quota group formats.  Then simple randomization is used to 
give a representative sample of new and old members within the quota groups.  Panelists 
are limited to one completed survey every 10 days with the research company 
maintaining full records on panelist activity.  Survey respondents receive a cash value 
reward based on the length of the survey and the target audience requested.  The reward 
is credited to their member account.  Once the respondent’s account value exceeds 
$10.00, the respondent may redeem his/her rewards for a choice of debit cards or gift 
certificates. 
 Respondents were asked if their business is privately held or publicly traded.  For 
the businesses that stated they were privately held, their responses to the questions 
regarding the number of owning family members involved in ownership, in top 
management, and on the board were assessed to determine if the business was a family 
business.  A sample of 257 respondents was obtained after the data was screened for 
missing and invalid responses.  The electronic survey was completed by the Chief 
Financial Officer or an individual in an equivalent position in a privately held family 
business that could provide financial and business structure information.  The data 
received from the research company was anonymous with no information linking to the 
identification of the business or the respondent.   
 
 






 The demographics of the 257 respondents are presented in Table 1.  The majority 
of respondents were members of the owning family and have educational levels beyond 
that of high school and technical college.  One fourth are licensed CPAs and one half  
have been with the business between five to fifteen years.  Approximately half of the 
businesses have had an external audit during the last two fiscal years.  Additional 
demographic information is presented in Table 1.   
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable, the existence of an IAF, was defined as 1 = Yes having 
an IAF and 0 otherwise.  This dichotomous dependent variable was selected due to the 
focus of the research to determine the influence of family involvement on the existence of 
an IAF.  Considering the sensitivity of business information for privately held family 
businesses, this approach allowed a privately held family business to provide the 
requested data while maintaining a certain level of confidentiality.   
Independent Variable 
 The three independent variables of family involvement in ownership, family 
involvement in top management, and family involvement on the board of directors were 
measured by utilizing statements adapted from the power subscale of the Family – Power,  
Experience, Culture (F-PEC) scale (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Holt, 
Rutherford, & Kuratko, 2010; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005).  The 18-item F-PEC 
power subscale measures the extent of family influence in the ownership, top  
management, and the board of directors of the business.   
 The subscale assesses the degree of influence or power held by the family and 








Panel A - Respondent Demographics                           With IAF  Without IAF      Total 




          80 
          42 
         65 
         70 
      145 
      112 
 
Family Member Yes 
No 
          92 
          30 
       115 
         20 
      207 
        50 
 
Age (In years) Under 30 
30 – 39 
40 – 49 
50 – 59 
60 and Over 
            0 
          45 
          38 
          24 
          15 
         11 
         27 
         32 
         34 
         31 
        11 
        72  
        70 
        58 
        46 
 




            6 
            9 
          71 
          36 
         21 
         17 
         80 
         17 
        27 
        26 
      151 




          41 
          81 
         20 
       115 
        61 
     196 
 
Number of Years  
with the Business 
    <   5 
  5 - 10 
11 - 15 
    > 16 
          15 
          49 
          28 
          30 
         31 
         40 
         28 
         36 
       46 
       89 
       56 
       66 
 
  









Panel B - Business Demographics                          With IAF     Without IAF   Total 








         18 
         44 
         19 
         11 
         14 
         16 
         25 
         46 
         18 
           7 
         12 
         27 
      43 
      90 
      37 
      18 
      26 
      43 
 
Age of the Internal  
 Auditing Function 
(In years) 
    <   5 
  5 - 15 
    > 15  
         37 
         67 
         18 
       
 
      37 
      67 
      18 
 
External Audit  - Performed 
by: 





No External Audit 
         22 
         24 
         13 
         22 
         41 
           9 
         11 
           6 
         12 
         97 
      31 
      35 
      19 
      34 
    138 
 
Audit Committee Yes 
No 
         57 
         65 
         12 
       123 
      69 
    188 
 





provides scores that can be used as independent, dependent, mediating, or moderating 
variables (Astrachan et al. 2002; Klein et al. 2005).  Cronbach’s alpha was ά = .75 for 
past studies utilizing the power subscale (Klein et al. 2005).  For this study, the power 
subscale was adapted to eliminate questions that were not applicable to family businesses 
in the United States and to add statements related to the number of top management 
positions.  The final adapted subscale included a total of eight questions: (a) four 
questions related to ownership, (b) two questions related to top management, and (c) two 
questions related to the board of directors.   
 The involvement of the family in ownership was asked as the percentage of 
voting and controlling rights held by owning family members.  The involvement of the 
family in top management was a calculation of the total number of top management 
positions currently held by members of the owning family divided by the total number of 
top management positions.  In addition, the involvement of the family on the board of 
directors was a calculation of the total number of board members who were members of 
the owning family divided by the total number of board members.  Following the F-PEC 
scale guidelines, family was defined as offspring of a couple (no matter what generation), 
their in-laws, and any legally adopted children (Astrachan et al. 2002). 
Moderating Variable 
 The 12 item F-PEC culture subscale (Astrachan et al. 2002) was used as one part 
of the process of collecting the data to determine the moderating influence of family 
business culture on the relationship between family involvement and the existence of an 
IAF.  The F-PEC culture subscale has been utilized in prior research to assess the extent 
to which family and business values overlap and employees are committed to the 





business (e.g., Klein et al. 2005; Zahra et al. 2008).  In the original scale a five-point 
Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (Not at all) and 5 (To a large extent) was used for the 
three statements.  The other nine statements were measured on a five-point Likert-type 
scale anchored by 1 (Strongly disagree) and 5 (Strongly agree).  Cronbach’s alpha of ά = 
.93 from prior research suggests sound levels of internal consistency (Klein et al. 2005).  
For this study, the original scales were expanded to an eleven-point Likert-type scale 
anchored by 0 (Not at all) and 10 (To a large extent) to increase variability and precision 
of the measurement (Hair et al. 2007).  One double-barrelled statement was split into two 
statements and one triple-barrelled statement was split into three statements, for a total of 
15 items. 
 The Denison Organizational Culture Survey (Denison & Mishra, 1995) assesses 
the organizational culture of the business in the areas of involvement, consistency, 
adaptability, and mission.  This survey was the starting point for the second measurement 
of culture to be included in family business culture.  The Denison Organizational Culture 
Survey is an established, globally recognized measurement of organizational culture 
(Denison, Haaland, & Goelzer, 2003; Denison & Mishra, 1995; Fey & Denison, 2003; 
Yilmaz & Ergun, 2008).  In addition, the survey has been used in prior research on 
recognizing and leveraging the unique strengths of family culture (Denison et al. 2004).   
 Although organizational culture has many aspects, the extent to which family 
members in the family business have shared goals and values is anticipated to moderate 
the strength of the relationship between family involvement and the existence of an IAF.  
Therefore, for this study the measurement of organizational culture focused on two 
subsets, core values and goals and objectives, of the Denison Organization Culture 





Survey.  Each of the following subsets of the original scale is comprised of five items and 
uses a five-point Likert-type scale with response categories anchored by 1 (Strongly 
disagree) and 5 (Strongly agree).  For this study the scale was revised to a seven-point 
Likert-type scale with the same anchors.  The expanded scale allowed for greater 
variability and precision of the measurement (Hair et al. 2007).  
 Core Values (subset of Consistency) measures shared core values and the ethical 
code of the family as literature has repeatedly shown that family businesses are value or 
culture driven (Astrachan et al. 2002; Denison et al. 2004; Vallejo, 2011).  Two 
statements were determined to be double-barrelled and were revised for purposes of this 
study.  In addition, one statement from Agreement (another subset of Consistency), 
“There is a strong culture” in this organization was included as an overall measurement 
of the perception of the strength of the organizational culture.  The Cronbach’s alpha for 
all 15 original statements of the Consistency index, including the five statements for the 
Core Values subset, was ά = .79 in prior research (Denison & Mishra, 1995). 
 Goals and Objectives (subset of Mission) examines if goals and objectives are 
understood, agreed upon, and tracked in the business.  According to previous research, 
lack of understanding or disagreement of the goals of the business and the goals of the 
family can impair the sustainability of the business (Mahto, Davis, Pearce, & Robinson, 
2010; Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997).  The original 15 statements of the Mission 
index, including the five statements from the Goals and Objectives subset, have exhibited 
a Cronbach’s alpha of ά = .81 in extant research (Denison & Mishra, 1995). 
 
 






 Audit Committee –  An Audit Committee may perform as a substitute governance 
mechanism for an IAF or serve as a oversight entity for the internal audit and/or external 
audit activities (Barua et al. 2010; Carcello et al. 2005).  There are implications for the 
existence of an IAF in either situation.  The respondents were asked if their business had 
an audit committee with a Yes/No answer. 
 Firm Size – Consistent with prior research the traditional characteristic of firm 
size was included as a control variable (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Anderson, Francis, & 
Stokes, 1993; Carcello et al. 2005; Chow, 1982; Daily & Dollinger, 1992).  Firm size was 
measured by the natural log of full time employees (Carey et al. 2000; Eddleston & 
Kellermanns, 2007; Mahto et al. 2010). 
 Firm Age – Prior research has supported that as firms mature and grow, more 
monitoring processes are often needed (Carcello et al. 2005; Casillas, Moreno, & 
Barbero, 2010; Chrisman et al. 2004; Schulze et al. 2001).  Firm age was measured using 
the number of years since the inception of the business (Carey et al. 2000; Lindow, 
Stubner, & Wulf, 2010; Sorenson, Goodpaster, Hedberg, & Yu, 2009). 
 Industry – Industry was utilized as a control variable (Chrisman et al. 2004; 
Schulze et al. 2001).  Five categories of retail, service, manufacturing, wholesale, and 
construction were used to identify the industry sectors in which the responding firms 
compete.  Respondents were also permitted to indicate a category of Other to enable the 
measurement of the five primary industry categories without over–specification (Casillas 
et al. 2010; Lindow et al. 2010; O’Boyle, Rutherford, & Pollack, 2010).  Financial 





institutions were excluded as the industry is highly regulated and may have compliance 
risks that mandate an IAF. 
 External Audit – External audit may be a substitute or complementary activity to 
an IAF (Carey et al. 2000) and therefore, impact the existence of an IAF.  Participants 
were asked how many external audits the business had completed within its last two 
fiscal years.  Six responses were available from which to select; (1) None, (2) 1, (3) 2, (4) 
3, (5) 4, or (6) > 4.  In addition, the respondents were asked to indicate the category of the 
firm performing the majority of the external audits: (1) International, (2) National, (3) 
Regional, or (4) Local. 
 Ownership Dispersion – Ownership dispersion was measured by asking for the 
ownership percentage of the three largest owners.  Prior research shows that large, 
majority owners are more involved in the business and therefore, more knowledgeable 
about the business resulting in a reduced desire for monitoring processes (Burkart et al. 
2003; Hoopes & Miller, 2006; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Schulze et al. 2003a).  This 
could affect the decision to invest in an IAF (Sarens & Abdolmohammadi, 2011).  
Dispersion was calculated as 100 percent minus the percentage of ownership of the three 
largest owners.  For example, a business with the largest owner with 50 percent, the 
second largest owner with 10 percent and the third largest owner with 5 percent was 
considered to be 35 percent dispersed (100 - 50 - 10 - 5 = 35). 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 The summary statistics for the full sample (n = 257) and for the sub-samples of 
businesses with and without an IAF are presented in Table 2.  The means of family  






Descriptive Statistics of Businesses With and Without an Internal Auditing Function 
 
        Group 0: Group 1: 
       Full  Without an With an 
    Sample      IAF      IAF 
    (n=257)    (n=135) (n=122) 




Family Involvement       
in Ownership   71.30    75.111 67.074             1.855  
 
Family Involvement 
in Top Management  71.91    79.363 63.664                 3.918*** 
 
Family Involvement 
on the Board   17.70    10.037 26.189     -4.348*** 
 
Moderator 
Family Business Culture   8.02      7.951   8.099     -1.070 
 
Control Variables 
Audit Committee  
(0=No, 1=Yes)      .27        .090     .470     -7.525*** 
 
Firm Size (ln)     2.84      2.091             3.671        -5.011*** 
 
External Audit 
(0=No, 1=Yes)      .46       .280     .660     -6.621*** 
 
Ownership Dispersion            10.51     8.874 12.320     -1.506 
 
*** = p < .001 
See TABLE 3 for variable definitions 
   





involvement in ownership and top management is higher for businesses without an IAF.  
For all other variables the means were higher for businesses with an IAF.  The mean 
differences between the groups reached statistical significance for family involvement in 
top management, family involvement on the board, and three of the four control 
variables.  The higher means for businesses without an IAF for family involvement in 
ownership and in top management are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2.  The mean for 
family involvement on the board is higher for businesses with an IAF which is 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 3.  
 Table 3 displays the results of the Pearson correlation matrix.  The significant 
negative correlation between ownership dispersion and family involvement in ownership 
is understandable given that as the three largest owners control more, the amount of 
ownership dispersed would be less.  The only other correlations greater than .500 were 
related to firm size and were anticipated.   
Moderating Variable – Family Business Culture  
 An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed on the 26 items (15 F-PEC 
items and 11 Denison items) to analyze the correlations among the items.  A VARIMAX  
orthogonal rotation method was employed to simplify the columns of the factor analysis 
and give a clear separation of the factors.  Factor loadings were considered significant at  
.35 with a sample size of 257 (Hair, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  Three iterations of factor 
analysis resulted in the removal of three items from the Denison Organizational Culture 
Survey.  The remaining 23 items loaded into three factors.  The three factors had 
communalities greater than .500.  The overall and individual item measures of sampling  
 







Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
     
Variables      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8 
   
1. Existence of an IAF (a)     
 
2. Audit Committee (b) .43** 
 
3. Firm Size (c)  .30** .45** 
 
4. External Audit (d)  .38** .44** .58** 
 
5. Ownership  
    Dispersion (e)  .09 .29** .62** .45** 
 
6. Family Involvement   
    In Ownership (f)            -.12     -.41**  -.55**  .-42** -.55** 
 
7. Family Involvement 
    In Top Management (g)    -.24**  -.40**  -.59**  .-41** -.38**  .47** 
 
8. Family Involvement 
    On the Board (h)  .26** .29** .21** .26**  .05 -.07 -.13* 
 
9. Family Business  .07 .04      -.09      -.07      -.02       .08  .18**  -.03     
    Culture (i) 
 
n = 257, * = p < .05; ** = p < .01 
 
(a) Does the business an IAF? 0 = No (n = 135) or 1 = Yes (n = 122) 
(b) Does the business have an Audit Committee?  0 = No (n = 188) or 1 = Yes (n = 69) 
(c) Natural log of full time employees 
(d) Has the business had an external audit during the last 2 fiscal years?  0 = No (n = 138) 
or 1 = Yes (n = 119) 
(e) 100% minus the percentage of ownership of the three largest owners 
(f) The percentage of voting/controlling family members 
(g) The percentage of top management positions currently held by family members 
(h) The percentage of board members that are members of the owning family 
(i) New construct – See Appendices A and B for more detail 
 
Note:  Family member is defined as offspring of a couple (no matter what generation),            
their in-laws, and any legally adopted children.   






adequacy were greater than .500, and the three factors explained 71.93 percent of the 
total variance.  A Cronbach’s alpha was used as a diagnostic measure to assess the 
consistency of the factors.  Cronbach’s alphas of ά = .95, ά= .95, and ά = .80 provided 
evidence of high internal consistency within the three factors.     
 A second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was utilized as the next step 
in developing the Family Business Culture construct.  The second-order factor model 
involves two layers of latent constructs and is similar to a first-order model in that the 
first-order constructs are viewed as indicators (Hair et al. 2010).  Theoretically, the F-
PEC culture subscale items and the sub-sets of culture selected from the Denison 
Organizational Culture Survey items share the same general level of abstraction.  
Therefore, the first-order model meets the first requirement of theoretical justification.  
Secondly, the three factors developed in the first-order factor analysis are expected to 
influence other related constructs in the same way.  And finally, at least three first-order 
constructs can be used in order to meet the minimum conditions for identification and 
good measurement practice (Hair et al. 2010).   
 The second-order factor analysis was conducted in AMOS 17.0.  The model with 
the best fit was developed by reviewing the Modification Indices (Standardized 
Regression Weights, known as factor loadings in SPSS) and removing the variables with 
the largest amounts in order to improve the model fit.  Seven iterations were completed 
with an item removed in each stage.  The final model consisted of 16 items, had a Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of .079, a normed Chi-Square 





(CMIN/DF) of 2.6, and a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .96 indicating acceptable model 
fit (Hair et al. 2010).   
 Convergent validity, the extent to which indicators of a construct converge or 
share variance, was tested by assessing the loading estimates.  Three loadings, 
Standardized Regression Weights, did have amounts slightly below the .700 
recommended amount, but were still above the .50 acceptable amount (Hair et al. 2010).  
Internal reliability was verified by a Cronbach’s alpha of ά= .94.  Appendix A displays 
the final CFA model.  The rectangle boxes on Appendix A include the Statement 
numbers that refer to the complete Statements in the Statement # column in Appendix B.  
For example, box S23_3 on Appendix A refers to S23_3 in the Statement # column of 
Appendix B.  Appendix B includes:  (1) the original scale statements, (2) the revised 
statements that were included in this survey, (3) the iterations completed in the EFA and 
second-order CFA, and (4) the final loadings.   
   The average summated score was calculated for the remaining16 items of the 
Family Business Culture construct, resulting in an average level of Family Business 
Culture for each respondent.   
Statistical Analysis 
 The model consists of a dichotomous dependent variable (1 = Yes if the existence 
of IAF and 0 otherwise), three independent variables (family involvement in ownership, 
in top management, and on the board), one moderator variable (family business culture), 
three interactions (each independent variable * the moderator variable) and four control 
variables.  The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable leads to logistical 
regression as the preferred statistical method for testing the proposed relationships (Hair 





et al. 2010).  Unlike multiple regression and discriminant analysis, which rely on the 
assumptions of normality, logistic regression is more robust when these assumptions are 
not met (Hair et al. 2010).  This method is designed to predict the probability of an event 
occurring and can easily incorporate both metric and nonmetric independent and control 
variables (Hair et al. 2010).  
 The total sample of 257 responses was randomly divided into an analysis sample 
of n=130 and a holdout sample of n=127.  The number in each sample is similar to ensure 
the recommended minimum number of 10 observations per estimated parameter in both 
samples (Hair et al. 2010).  Three approaches were used to assess the overall fit of both 
the logistic regression samples; (1) statistical measures, (2) pseudo R² measures, and (3) 
classification accuracy as expressed by the hit ratio.   
Analysis Sample 
 A null model without any independent variables was calculated to serve as a 
baseline for evaluating improvements to model fit.  The independent variables, control 
variables, the moderator variable, and three interaction terms were then added to the 
analysis model and the statistical significance of the -2 Log likelihood (-2LL) was 
assessed.  The difference between the initial -2LL and the final -2LL was equal to the 
model chi-square statistic used in the test of overall statistical significance of the model.  
In this model the -2LL was statistical significant at chi-square 53.886 (p < .001) 
indicating that the variables were significant in improving the model estimation fit.  Two 
pseudo R² measures, based on the reduction in -2LL, were calculated. The Cox and Snell 
R² value equaled .339 and the Nagelkerke R² value equaled .457.  These values indicate 
good model fit when compared to R² values found in multiple regression.  The final 





analysis model reduced the significance level of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test to .694 
n.s.  This nonsignifcant value indicates that the analysis model fit is acceptable. 
 The initial hit ratio of 58.5 percent in the analysis model improved to 78.5 percent 
in the final model for an increase of greater than 25 percent (58.5 * 1.25 = 73.13).  The 
proportional chance criterion was derived by calculating the proportion of observations 
for each group based on the number of observations in each group in the Classification 
Table at Block 0 and then squaring and summing the proportion of cases in each group.  
The formula is  
    CPRO = p² + (1 - p)²  
where    p = proportion of observations in group 1 
         1 – p = proportion of observations in group 2 
 
The calculation for the analysis sample results in 51.43 percent (.5846² + (1 - .5846)² = 
.34178 +.17254).  In addition, the classification accuracy should be at least 25 percent 
greater than that achieved by chance (Hair et al. 2010).  The analysis sample actual 
prediction accuracy of 78.50 percent is more than 25 percent greater than the percent 
proportional chance criterion indicating internal validity (51.43 * 1.25 = 64.29).  The 
prediction accuracy of 78.50 percent is also 25 percent greater than the maximum chance 
criterion for the analysis sample calculated at 50.00 percent (65/130 = .5000). 
Holdout Sample 
 The holdout sample of 127 observations was tested next following the same steps 
listed above for the analysis sample.  The -2LL reduction was once again statistically 
significant with a chi-square of 50.572 (p < .001).  The Cox & Snell R² value equaled 
.328 and the Nagelkerke R² equaled .439 accounting for 33 percent and 44 percent of the 





variation in the dependent measure.  The Hosmer and Lemeshow significance level was 
reduced to .426 n.s. for the holdout model indicating that model fit is acceptable. 
 The final hit ratio of 74.80 percent was more than 25 percent greater than the 
initial hit ratio of 53.50 percent (53.50 * 1.25 = 66.88).  In addition, the 74.80 percent hit 
ratio was also 25 percent greater than the proportional chance criterion of 50.25 percent 
(50.25 * 1.25 = 62.81).   Once again, the final hit ratio is 25 percent greater than the 
maximum chance criterion of 41.73 (53/127 = 41.73) indicating validity of the model.   
Hypotheses Testing 
 Neither Hypothesis 1predicting a negative association between family 
involvement in ownership and the existence of an IAF, nor Hypothesis 2 predicting a 
negative association between family involvement in top management and the existence of 
an IAF were supported.  Statistical significance was identified in the association with 
family involvement on the board and the existence of an IAF; however the association 
was positive as opposed to negative as predicted by Hypothesis 3.  The results of 
Hypothesis 3 indicate that a one unit increase in family involvement on the board 
increases the likelihood, on average, by 2 percent (Exp(B) = 1.020, (1.020-1.0)*100 = 2 
percent) of the existence of an IAF.  
 Neither the moderator nor interaction effects revealed statistical significance 
resulting in Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 not being supported.  The existence of an audit 
committee and having had an external audit during the last two fiscal years are better 
predictors of the existence of an IAF than involvement of the family.  With the reference 
points for the dichotomous variables set at 1 = Yes, calculating the percentage change in 
odds reveals that businesses without an audit committee are 79.8%, on average, less 





likely to have an IAF (Exp(B) = .202, (.202 – 1.0) * 100) than businesses with an audit 
committee.  In addition, businesses that have not had an external audit during the last two 
fiscal years are 67%, on average, less likely to have an IAF (Exp(B) = .330, (.330 – 1.0) * 
100) than businesses not having had an external audit during the last two fiscal years.  
The results of the logistic regression are included in Table 4.  
Additional Validation 
 
 The discriminatory power of the analysis sample compared to a holdout sample 
was statistically tested using Press’s Q statistic.  The statistic compares the number of  
correct classifications with the total sample size and the number of groups using the 
  
following formula:   [ N – (nK)]² 
    Press’s Q =   N (K – 1) 
 
  where:  N = Total sample size 
    n = number of observations correctly classified 
    K = number of groups 
 
  Press’s Q analysis sample =    [130 – (102 * 2)]²   =  42.12 
                              130 – (2 – 1) 
    
 
  Press’s Q holdout sample =    [127 –   (95 * 2)]²   =  31.25 
                                     127 – (2 – 1)  
 
 
If the calculated Press’s Q value exceeds the critical value, then the classification can be 
recognized as statistically better than chance.  The critical value is defined as the chi-
square value for one degree of freedom at the desired confidence level.  The critical value 
at a significance level of .01 equals 6.63.  Therefore, the hit ratios for both the analysis 
and holdout samples exceed the all comparison standards and exhibit internal and 
external validity.   









         
Variables            B          S.E.      Wald         Sig      Exp(B)  
 
Independent Variables 
Family Involvement in Ownership         .007         .009 .578    .447        1.007 
Family Involvement in Top Mgt           -.014         .010       2.237    .135           .986 
Family Involvement on the Board          .020         .008       5.919*    .015        1.020 
 
Moderator 
Family Business Culture                 .170         .228        .556    .456        1.185 
 
Interactions 
Family Involvement in Ownership x  
Family Business Culture     -.002         .007 .066    .797         .998 
Family Involvement in Top Mgt x 
Family Business Culture      .002         .006 .143    .705       1.002 
Family Involvement on the Board x 
Family Business Culture      .005         .006 .652    .419       1.005 
 
Control Variables 
Audit Committee (0=No, 1=Yes)       -1.600         .692       5.345*    .021          .202 
Firm Size (ln)                   .194         .164       1.402    .236       1.214  
External Audit (0=No, 1=Yes)            -1.107         .559       3.928*    .047          .330 
Ownership Dispersion                -.037         .019       3.578        .059         .964 
            
-2 Log Likelihood  267.758 
Chi-Square     87.861*** 
Cox and Snell R²        .290 
Nagelkerke R²         .386 
Hit Ratio     76.7% 
 
n = 257, * = p < .05; *** = p < .001 





    
 
 





Additional Sensitivity Tests 
 Multicollinearity was tested by examining the standard errors for the B 
coefficients.  No standard errors were larger than 2.0 indicating that multicollinearity was 
not an issue (Hair et al. 2010).1 
 Common method bias was controlled through the design of the survey tool and 
statistical procedures (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003).  
Although the measurement of the independent variable (family involvement) and the 
dependent variable (the existence of an IAF) were collected from a single respondent, the 
measurements were reported as numbers, percentages, and yes/no as opposed to 
perceptions.  The measurement statements for the moderator variable, the perception 
variable, were from established, validated scales.  The scales were adapted slightly to 
eliminate double-barrelled, vague, or outdated statements and to yield more variability.  
The two sets of moderator statements consisted of different scale endpoints to reduce 
method bias caused by commonalities in scale endpoints and anchoring effects.   
 In addition, common method bias was tested as suggested by Podsakoff et al. 
(2003).  The independent, moderator, and control variables were entered into a factor 
analysis.  Three factors were extracted with eigenvalues >1.0, which accounted for 59 
percent of the variance.  The first factor accounted for 30 percent of the variance with the 
other variables accounting for 19 and 10 percent, respectively.  Common method bias 
was not considered to be an issue because the individual factors separated cleanly and no 
single factor accounted for the majority of the variance. 
                                                 
1 Logistic regression does not require specific distributions of the independent variables and therefore 
heteroscedasticity is not an issue. 





 Two additional analyses of the moderator of family business culture were 
conducted to further examine the possible influence of the moderator.  First, the 
independent variables and the moderator were centered before calculating the product 
term to test the interaction (Aiken & West, 1991).  This analysis did not reveal a 
significant influence of family business culture.  Second, a dummy variable was created 
for family business culture consisting of 0 = low culture and 1 = high culture.  An 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine any differences between the 
two groups.  Once again, family business culture was not found to have a significant 
moderating influence. 
DISCUSSION 
Findings and Implications 
 The limited, and sometimes contradictory, research on the IAF in family 
businesses has left many questions unanswered.  Carey et al. (2000) found a positive 
association between the separation of ownership and control and the demand for external 
audit in medium sized family businesses in Australia.  However, the same relationship for 
internal auditing was not supported in the Carey et al. (2000) study.  This research is the 
first step in gaining more knowledge of the antecedents of an IAF in privately held family 
businesses and the impact that family involvement in the three critical areas of 
ownership, top management and on the board might have on the need for such 
accountability systems.   
 Agency theory suggests that as the gap between the agent and the principal/owner 
expands, (i.e., less involvement of the family in this study), the need for monitoring  





systems would increase (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  This would result in a negative 
relationship between family involvement in ownership, top management, and on the 
board of directors and the existence of an IAF.  However, this study found no significant 
relationship, neither positive nor negative, between family involvement in ownership or 
in top management and the existence of an IAF.  With regards to family involvement on 
the board, a significant relationship was identified, but positive, contrary to the predicted 
negative relationship.  Perhaps Type II agency problems apply in that as family 
involvement on the board increases other owners, either nonfamily owners or minority 
family owners, insist on governance mechanisms, such as an IAF.   
 Thus, while this study does not produce the predicted results, the study adds 
interesting information to the ongoing debate of the applicability of agency theory to 
family businesses.  On one side of the controversy, the significant positive results related 
to family involvement on the board is in agreement with Bartholomeusz & Tanewski 
(2006) who argue that in the area of corporate governance, family control creates, rather 
than negates, agency costs.  This result is also interesting because it refers to Type II 
agency problems and suggests that an IAF could be a method that privately held family 
businesses are utilizing to address this issue.  On the other side of the applicability of 
agency issues in family businesses, the association between family involvement in 
ownership and in top management and the IAF was not statistical significant, indicating 
no influence on agency costs with differing levels of family involvement in these areas. 
 Interestingly, in contrast to research aligning family business decisions with 
family control and involvement, this study suggests that the existence of an audit 
committee and the existence of an external audit are better predictors of the existence of 





an IAF than family involvement in ownership, in top management, or on the board of 
directors.  
 The study developed the new family business culture construct as a replicable 
measure of the influence of the combined cultures of the family and of the business 
interacting within family businesses.  With an internal reliability score in the excellent 
range, the construct provides a new measure to better research family and business 
dynamics.  One potential explanation for the lack of the new construct to moderate the 
relationships in this study might be that business processes are less susceptible to the 
influence of culture, dictated instead by best practice decisions.  This is one of the first 
studies to examine a business process, such as an IAF, in privately held family businesses 
in the United States and much remains to be explored in this area. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 A limitation of the study, although managed with survey design and statistical 
tests, was the fact of a single respondent from each business.  In addition, the respondents 
were all in positions of financial responsibility at their business.  While this was the 
appropriate person to provide the financial and ownership data for the survey, future 
research could provide more robust analysis for the family business culture construct by 
obtaining multiple responses from the same business at different organizational levels 
and in different responsibility areas.  
 The unexpected results surface some interesting questions related to the power of 
the board in privately held family businesses.  One aspect influencing the results might be 
the fact that the board could be the main decision making body in the business.  In that 
role, the board represents the ownership group and gives direction to top management, 





therefore dominating the other two independent variables of family involvement.  More 
information on the interaction between these three groups could provide valuable insights 
to decisions involving business processes, controls, and accountability.  
 The results of this study suggest that family involvement in ownership and in top 
management is not a determining factor in the existence of an IAF in a privately held 
family business.  However, at the board level, family involvement does matter.  The 
explanatory power of the traditional agency variables used in this study is relatively weak 
in these businesses.  Additional research should address other potential reasons for the 
decision to invest in an IAF.  What characteristics of the business or the family have an 
impact on that decision?  And are there benefits to be gained from investing in the 
function, as evidenced in publically traded companies?  
 In addition, future research is needed to further validate the new family business 
culture construct.  Family business research in any areas that have the potential to be 
influenced by variations in goals, core values, and relationships could benefit from 
including the construct in their study.  The new construct could provide an additional 
measure to assist in gaining more understanding in areas that may have had conflicting 
results in the past. 
 Privately held family businesses, a predominant form of business structure in the 
United States and globally, remain a fertile area for research inquiry.  This research has 
taken the first step of applying agency theory to the area of the IAF in these businesses; 
an area not yet researched in the United States.    
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 CHAPTER 3 
INVESTMENT IN INTERNAL AUDITING, FAMILY BUSINESS OUTCOMES, AND 
THE MODERATING ROLE OF FAMILY BUSINESS CULTURE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Research has indicated that an internal auditing function (IAF) can have a positive 
influence on corporate governance and firm performance in publicly traded companies.  
However, it remains an open question if similar benefits of an IAF are experienced in 
privately held family businesses.  Understanding the impact of the investment in an IAF 
on family business outcomes can help family businesses to increase economic growth and 
sustainability.  This research explores the relationship between the investment in an IAF 
and the family business outcomes of objective and subjective financial performance, trust 
in the business and in top management, and affective commitment.  Agency theory is 
used to investigate the potential influence of the investment in an IAF on objective and 
subjective financial performance measures.  Social exchange theory is employed to assess 
the potential impact of the IAF on trust and affective commitment.  The study also 
develops a family business culture construct and investigates the potential moderating 
effect of the construct on the analysis.  The results do not reveal significant relationships 
with the level of dollar investment in an IAF, nor indicate a moderating influence of 
family business culture.  However, additional analysis does reveal a positive relationship 







 Internal auditing is defined by the Institute of Internal Auditors as “An 
independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and 
improve an organization’s operations.  It helps an organization accomplish its objectives 
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness 
of risk management, control, and governance processes” (IIA, 1999).  The internal 
auditing function (IAF) has been shown to have a positive influence on corporate 
governance, reporting quality, and firm performance in publicly traded companies 
(Gordon & Smith, 1992; Gramling, Maletta, Schneider, & Church, 2004).  The purpose 
of this research is to investigate whether there are similar benefits of an IAF in privately 
held family businesses.       
 While the IAF has been studied extensively in the realm of large, publicly traded 
firms, relatively little is known about the function and related outcomes among privately 
held family businesses.  However, family businesses (publicly traded and privately held) 
play a leading role in global economic production and employment, totaling 65 to 80 
percent of business worldwide (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; IFERA, 2003; 
Mandl, 2008).  Research in the United States has shown that family businesses generate 
approximately 60% of the country’s employment (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003) and 
account for 50% of gross domestic product and 78% of new job creation (Perman, 2006).  
 Anderson & Reeb (2003) found that family ownership was prevalent and 
substantial in Standard & Poor’s 500 firms, with family businesses comprising 35% of 
the listed companies.  In the United States, the majority of research related to family 






businesses (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; McConaugby, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001; 
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  This has 
resulted in a vast section of the U.S. economy, primarily comprised of privately held 
family businesses, remaining unexplored. 
 While the possible outcome variables that could be measured are numerous, for 
the purposes of this study, three family business outcomes were measured and examined: 
(1) financial performance (objective and subjective), (2) trust (in the business and in top 
management), and (3) affective commitment.   
 Privately held family businesses provide a new context in which to investigate the 
impact of a form of governance mechanism, an IAF, on firm performance.  Debicki, 
Matherne, Kellermanns, & Chrisman (2009) analyzed 291 family business research 
articles published in 30 management journals during the period of 2001 to 2007.  One of 
the three main gaps identified in the Debicki et al. (2009) research was the impact of 
governance of the family, and of the firm, on family business performance.  Basco & 
Rodriquez (2009) suggest that the research on family business performance will improve 
when equal attention is given to the governance of both the family and the business.  
Following this suggestion, the present research addresses both domains by measuring the 
influence of an IAF on family business outcomes, moderated by family business culture.         
 Prior research has acknowledged that privately held family businesses employ 
measures of performance that may be different from traditional financial measures.  
Family independence and employment (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Kuratko, 
Hornsby, & Naffziger, 1997), family reputation (Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; Gomez-






(Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997), and family activities and products are often 
valued at least as much as, if not more than, profits, return on assets or other financial 
results (Astrachan, 2010; Chua, Chrisman, & Steier, 2003).  When family business 
outcomes fail to meet the family’s goals, the family members’ motivation to continue the 
investment and involvement in the business may be reduced (Kuratko et al. 1997).  
Therefore, understanding the relationship of variables, such as an IAF, with family 
business outcomes could help family business managers prolong the life of their business 
and increase economic growth and sustainability (Aronoff & Ward, 1991).    
 Research on family business performance has produced ambiguous results.  Some 
studies have found that strong personal ties and close identification with the family create 
an element of responsiveness to environmental shifts (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003; 
Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008) that may result in improved firm 
performance.  Denison, Lief, & Ward (2004) indicated that family businesses have 
distinct performance-enhancing cultures.  However, other studies have indicated an array 
of detrimental effects of family influence such as expropriation of wealth from minority 
shareholders (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a), 
lack of professionalism (Hall & Nordqvist, 2008), non-reciprocal altruism (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), shirking (Dyer, 
2006; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Schulze et al. 2001), excessive 
concern with wealth preservation (Carney, 2005), entrenchment (Burkart et al. 2003), and 
adverse selection (Dyer, 2006), all of which may decrease firm performance.   
 One potential reason for the conflicting results could be diverse definitions of 






(Astrachan, 2010; Holt, Rutherford, & Kuratko, 2010; Sharma, 2004).  Another potential 
reason could be the moderating effect of the unique and dynamic culture of the family, a 
variable often overlooked in empirical research (Dyer, 2003, 2006; Vallejo, 2011).  
Family businesses are in the unique and complex situation of combining the culture of the 
family with the culture of the organization.  Family culture exerts powerful influences 
over what family business members do and how they interpret and respond to 
environmental challenges (Zahra et al. 2008).  Therefore, researchers have suggested 
including the culture of the family as a variable in future studies (Dyer, 2003, 2006; 
Vallejo, 2011).  Following this suggestion, this research combines the culture of the 
family with the culture of the organization to form a single, comprehensive measure of 
culture, referred to as “family business culture”.  Family business culture enables an 
analysis of the impact of differing levels of culture on the relationship between an IAF 
and three specific family business outcomes.   
 While gaining knowledge of the impact of an IAF on financial performance is 
important, trust and affective commitment are also key outcomes in a family business.  
Scholars across time and disciplines agree that trust is highly beneficial to the functioning 
of organizations (see Dirks & Ferrin (2001) for a summary).  Trust results in more 
positive attitudes, higher levels of workplace behavior, and superior levels of 
performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001).  In addition, trust serves as a lens to interpret 
behaviors and serves as a basis for a person’s decision regarding whether, and how to, 
interact with others (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009).  Research suggests that family 
businesses may be unique in their ability to capitalize on trust (Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & 






particular relevance in family businesses (Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, & Chua, 2010) 
and is therefore an outcome measure in this study.  The decision to implement and 
maintain an IAF could have been made by top management or by the organization.  
Therefore, trust in top management and trust in the organization will be measured to 
evaluate if the investment in an IAF influences trust at either of these two levels.     
 Individuals with high levels of affective commitment have a strong alignment 
with the organization’s goals (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Sharma & Irving, 2005).  High 
levels of affective commitment can result in behaviors that go above and beyond the call 
of duty to the business (Sharma & Irving, 2005; Shore & Wayne, 1993; Van Dyne, 
Graham, & Dienesch, 1994).  These discretionary behaviors have been found to be 
critical for effective organizational functioning and firm performance (Van Dyne et al. 
1994).  The existence of high levels of commitment is frequently regarded as one of the 
advantages of family businesses compared to nonfamily businesses (Poutziouris, 2001; 
Tagiuri & Davis, 1996).  In addition, Vallejo (2009) found that the affective commitment 
dimension in family businesses had the strongest positive effect on the level of 
identification of nonfamily employees.  These findings indicate that affective 
commitment is a key dimension influencing efforts toward the profitability and continuity 
of the family business. 
 In summary, high levels of trust and affective commitment can enhance 
organizational responsiveness to the identification and rapid exploitation of profitable 
opportunities, possibly leading to a source of competitive advantage and sustainability of 






Therefore, it is important to research managerial actions, such as the investment in an 
IAF, that might foster or damage trust and affective commitment.     
 An integration of two theories provides the theoretical foundation for this study.  
Consistent with prior research related to an IAF, agency theory is used to examine the 
relationship between the investment in a governance mechanism, an IAF, and financial 
performance.  Adams (1994) stated that agency theory can help explain the existence, 
role and responsibilities of an IAF.  Agency theory suggests that the IAF, in conjunction 
with other mechanisms like financial reporting and external auditing, helps to maintain 
cost-efficient contracting between owners and managers (Sherer & Kent, 1983).  In 
addition, Sherer & Kent (1983) argue that the information provided by the IAF to 
management provides the opportunity to remedy weaknesses in procedures before they 
have a significant effect on the overall financial condition of the organization.  Cost 
savings can be achieved as a result of the internal auditor’s specific industry and business 
knowledge, increasing the bottom line.    
 The second theory, social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), with its basis in the norm 
of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), has long been utilized by organizational researchers to 
examine the motivation for employee behaviors and formation of employee attitudes 
(Levinson, 1965; March & Simon, 1958).  Social exchange theory is among the most 
influential concepts for understanding workplace behavior (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 
2005; Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996).  However, the theory has rarely been used in the 
context of an IAF.   
 Social exchange theory suggests that trust and organizational commitment reflect 






that exists between the organization and themselves.  In other words, individuals’ 
perceptions of an IAF may affect their levels of trust (Coletti, Sedatole, & Towry, 2005; 
Das & Bing-Sheng, 1998; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) and organizational commitment 
(Angle & Perry, 1981; Buchanan, 1974; Heinsman, de Hoogh, Koopman, & van Muijen, 
2006).  An entity devoted to assessing internal control, such as an IAF, can establish 
expectations and reliability, leading to predictability and an environment conducive to a 
beneficial exchange between employees and the business.  When employees perceive that 
the IAF is a tool to support their efforts, they may reciprocate with increased levels of 
trust and affective organizational commitment.   
 Social exchange theory is particularly applicable to the family business 
environment, as social exchange relationships are characterized by a long-term 
orientation (Emerson, 1976), which is commonly found in some family businesses (Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006).  This relates to the exchange of both tangible and 
intangible resources, including trust and commitment (Emerson, 1981).  In addition, 
extant literature indicates that attitudes and values of family members, particularly 
commitment to the business, can be beneficial contributors to family business outcomes 
and performance (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008).          
 This research expands family business research in several areas.  First, measuring 
financial and nonfinancial aspects of performance allows the inclusion of idiosyncratic 
goals of the owning family (Astrachan, 2010).  Second, this study provides knowledge 
related to the impact of an IAF on various outcomes across family businesses.  Finally, 
organizational culture is combined with family culture to form a single construct referred 






the relationship between the investment in an IAF and family business outcomes.  This 
approach enables an analysis across family businesses, as opposed to the majority of 
extant research that has dichotomously compared family businesses to nonfamily 
businesses (Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005).   
 Several questions are critical to explore.  Is the investment in an IAF associated 
with family business outcomes, and if so, which outcomes?  Does family business culture 
influence the relationship between investment in an IAF and family business outcomes?  
Is the influence different for financial and nonfinancial outcomes?  The purpose of this 
study is to provide answers to these questions and address the identified gaps in the 
literature related to the IAF in privately held family businesses.  This knowledge can be 
used to determine to what extent an IAF is, or would be, a beneficial governance 
mechanism in privately held family businesses.      
The remainder of the paper consists of three sections.  The following section 
provides the theoretical background and introduces the hypotheses to be tested.  The 
subsequent section explains the sample selection, data collection, and the analytical 
methods utilized.  The final section discusses the implications of the research, identifies 
limitations and makes suggestions for future research. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The Internal Auditing Function (IAF) in Privately Held Family Businesses 
 The IAF is one of the internal controls acknowledged by the internationally 
recognized Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO, 1992).  Internal controls are 






mitigating risks to an organization’s achievement of its objectives (IIA, 1999).  Internal 
controls, such as systems of monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding, are used to mitigate 
risks by changing the incentives for opportunistic behavior (Coletti et al. 2005; Seal, 
Cullen, Dunlop, Berry, & Ahmed, 1999).  Over the last decade the role of the IAF has 
increased in prominence.   
 The Institute of Internal Auditors (2010) states that the IAF can serve “as an 
organization’s safety net for compliance with rules, regulations, and overall best 
practices.”  Knowledge of a company’s culture, operations, and risk profile is essential to 
company success and longevity (IIA, 2010).  The primary role of an IAF is to provide 
this crucial information to an organization and its oversight entities and therefore serve as 
a valuable resource for the business (IIA, 2010).   
 Despite the recent attention and benefits of an IAF, research on the relationship 
between an IAF and business outcomes is limited (Debicki et al. 2009; Trotman & 
Trotman, 2010).  The majority of prior research has focused on the quality of the IAF, the 
decision making processes of the internal auditor, or the relationships between the 
internal auditor and other stakeholders (Gramling et al. 2004).  Other research has 
examined factors associated with the existence (Carey, Simnett, & Tanewski, 2000), size 
(Anderson, Christ, Johnston, & Rittenberg, 2012; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006) and 
budget (Barua, Rama, & Sharma, 2010; Carcello, Hermanson, & Raghunandan, 2005) of 
an IAF.   
 However, research examining the relationship of an IAF to business outcomes is 
scarce, particularly in the context of family businesses (Carey et al. 2000; Debicki et al. 






economy, comprised primarily of privately held family businesses, remaining 
unexplored.  The importance of examining the relationship between a governance 
mechanism, such as an IAF, and family business outcomes has the potential of providing 
information concerning influences on economic growth and sustainability of the business.  
Questions arise as to what effects such governance mechanisms will have on desired 
employee behaviors such as motivation to participate and perform (Frankema & 
Koopman, 2004; Garrety, 2008; March & Simon, 1958) and, ultimately, family business 
outcomes.  Therefore, a better understanding of governance mechanisms, such as IAF, 
that could potentially impact family business outcomes is critical.   
Family Business Outcomes 
Financial Performance Measures and the IAF 
 From a theoretical perspective, agency theory has provided the framework for 
most of the prior research related to a firm’s utilization of an IAF (Adams, 1994; Carcello 
et al. 2005; Carey et al. 2000; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006; Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 
1991).  In their seminal article, Jensen & Meckling (1976) posited that agency costs do 
not apply when a wholly owned firm is managed by the owner because the owner will 
make decisions that maximize the utility of the business and the owner.   
 Other researchers, however, have suggested that family control actually creates 
situations of agency costs rather than negating them.  Expropriation of wealth from 
minority shareholders (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Schulze et al. 2003a), non-
reciprocal altruism (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b), adverse selection (Dyer, 2006), 
entrenchment (Burkart et al. 2003), and shirking (Dyer, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001; 






In other words, family involvement in the business has the potential to increase or 
decrease financial performance due to agency costs (Chrisman et al. 2004).   
 In researching family business financial performance, Bartholomeusz & Tanewski 
(2006) compared family businesses to nonfamily businesses listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange.  The researchers found that in order to improve financial firm 
performance and maximize firm value, family owners needed to adopt more transparent 
corporate governance structures and be subject to a greater discipline of independent 
monitoring.  In research of a sample of 1,376 privately held U.S. family businesses, 
Schulze et al. (2001) found family businesses that utilized internal control mechanisms 
similar to those of widely held firms (e.g., strategic planning and pay incentives), 
performed significantly better financially than those family businesses without such 
controls.  The authors concluded that it is essential that family businesses invest in 
internal controls that are deemed necessary for widely held firms.   
 One role of an IAF is to examine past events with the intention of improving 
future performance (Penini & Carmeli, 2009).  Extant research in publicly traded 
businesses has suggested that an IAF can have a positive influence in many areas 
including firm performance (Gordon & Smith, 1992; Gramling et al. 2004).  Penini & 
Carmeli (2009) state that audit results can be the basis for adjusting policies, priorities, 
structures and processes, and creating more effective and cost-beneficial activities.  
Based on the extant literature related to the benefits of an IAF to publicly traded 
businesses, the following hypotheses are proposed:  
H1a:  The investment in an IAF will be positively related to objective 






H1b:  The investment in an IAF will be positively related to subjective  
           financial performance measures in privately held family businesses 
Nonfinancial Performance Measures and the IAF 
 Performance, broadly defined, relates to efficiencies in utilizing resources as well 
as the accomplishment of organizational goals (Steers, 1976).  Performance in family 
businesses is multi-faceted, as these businesses have goals that are both financial and 
nonfinancial (Astrachan, 2010; Astrachan & Zellweger, 2008; Basco & Rodriquez, 2009; 
Chua et al. 2003; Hienerth & Kessler, 2006).  Some past family business research may 
have inaccurately defined performance as primarily related to financial profits (Westhead 
& Cowling, 1997).   
 However, families have a devotion and passion for the business that stems more 
from substantive missions and values than any desire for quick profits (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2003).  Stafford, Duncan, Dane, & Winter (1999) observed that family 
businesses have the opportunity to define success on their own terms, and often look 
beyond profitability to goals such as the ability to live and operate the business according 
to personal values or to pass the business to the next generation.  For example, family 
independence and satisfaction (Chrisman et al. 2004; Kuratko et al. 1997; Sorenson, 
1999), pursuit of market opportunities based upon family values, and respect in the 
community (Eddleston et al. 2008; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008; 
Sorenson, 1999) are possible goals resulting from a unique family culture. 
 The theory of social exchange (Blau, 1964), with its basis in the norm of 
reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), has long been utilized by organizational researchers to 






(Levinson, 1965; March & Simon, 1958).  Social exchange theory is among the most 
influential concepts for understanding workplace behavior (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 
2005).  One of the basic tenets of social exchange theory is that parties abide by certain 
rules or interactions of exchange (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).  These interactions are 
usually seen as interdependent and contingent on the actions of another person (Blau, 
1964).  
  Social exchange theory suggests there is an expectation of an unspecified future 
return, which is based on an individual trusting that the other parties to the exchange will 
discharge their obligations fairly in the long run (Blau, 1968).  Blau (1964) argues that 
unlike economic exchange, social exchange tends to engender feelings of personal 
obligations, gratitude, and trust that cannot be obtained by bargaining.  These feelings 
equate to a sign of mutual support and investment in the relationship.  Social exchange 
occurs within structures of mutual dependence whereby individuals and the organization 
are dependent upon each other for valued outcomes (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 
2000).     
Trust 
 Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer (1998, p. 395) define trust as “a 
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”  Trust, as a social 
construct, is a critical element at the center of relationships, influencing each 
party’s behavior toward the other (Blau, 1968; Deutschi, 1960; Neves & Caetano, 






favorable social exchanges (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Neves & 
Caetano, 2006).   
 Trust is not only a quality of individuals, but it is also a function of the 
qualities of the relationship between employees and firms and the institutional 
context in which those relationships are incorporated (Shapiro, 1987; Zucker, 
1986).  Businesses are challenged as they attempt to identify beneficial levels of 
internal controls, such as an IAF, while simultaneously considering the impact of  
the governance mechanism on trust (Coletti et al. 2005).  However, trust has not 
been fully integrated into the governance literature, which has primarily focused 
on agency theory to explain behavior and controls in firms (Bijlsma & Koopman, 
2003). 
 Organizational scholars have posited that control (Arrow, 1974; Ouchi, 1980) is 
built on a foundation of trust.  Controls are seen as a “process by which the elements of a 
system are made more predictable through the establishment of standards in the pursuit of 
some desired objective or state” (Leifer & Mills, 1996, p. 117).  A great amount of 
disagreement exists in the research that has been conducted on the relationship between 
controls and trust (Bijlsma & Koopman, 2003; Das & Bing-Sheng, 1998).  Controls have 
been interpreted as implying that one party does not trust the other (Das & Bing-Sheng, 
1998), resulting in decision makers perceiving other collaborators as less trustworthy 
(Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999).  In addition, control oriented management may overlook 
the impact of employees’ perception of trust on the resulting employee behaviors (Davis, 






 In contrast, other studies have found that a strong control system enhances the 
level of trust in collaborative situations (Coletti et al. 2005; Cruz et al. 2010).  If used 
properly, internal controls may help to build trust (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; 
Goold & Campbell, 1987) and predict or produce trust (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998; 
Sitkin & George, 2005).  The discussion in support of the trust building benefits of 
internal controls is that they establish expectations, predictability, a track record, and an 
objective evaluation process (Das & Bing-Sheng, 1998; Goold & Campbell, 1987; 
Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).  This creates an environment that is conducive to nurturing 
and strengthening trust (Das & Bing-Sheng, 1998).  Sitkin & Roth (1993) further suggest 
that internal controls can promote trust through reliability in several ways.  Fostering 
coordination, ensuring that employees are treated uniformly and their rights are protected, 
and minimizing resentment and concern are several ways of promoting trust through 
reliability (Sitkin & Roth, 1993).         
 While the majority of extant research has focused on various types of internal 
controls and governance mechanisms, and not specifically an IAF, it is anticipated that 
the relationships would also hold for this type of internal control.  In summary, prior 
research leads to the following hypotheses:  
H2a:  The investment in an IAF is positively related to trust in the business 
           in privately held family businesses. 
 Existing literature on trust in organizations suggests that managers who 
invoke and draw attention to their appropriate use of a variety of controls can 
engender greater trust (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001, Rousseau et al. 1998).  Sitkin & 






management, the consistent use of formal controls and reduced use of informal 
controls produced better results at maintaining the trust.  Bijlsma-Frankema & 
Costa, 2005 argue that subordinates’ trust in management is positively related to 
monitoring their performance, indicating that trust and control are positively 
related, and leading to the following hypothesis:   
H2b:  The investment in an IAF is positively related to trust in top 
           management in privately held family businesses 
Affective Commitment to an Organization  
 Organizational commitment is defined as “the strength of an individual’s 
identification with and involvement in a particular organization” (Porter, Steers, 
Mowday, & Boulian, 1974, p. 604).  The authors state that such commitment can 
generally be characterized by the following factors:  “(a) a strong belief in and acceptance 
of the organization’s goals and values; (b) a willingness to exert considerable effort on 
behalf of the organization; and (c) a definite desire to maintain organizational 
membership” (Porter et al. 1974, p. 604).  Social exchange theory has provided a 
framework to study organizational commitment (Blau, 1964; Masterson, Lewis, 
Goldman, & Taylor, 2000).  Social exchange theorists have proposed that employees are 
prone to exchange their commitment for an employer’s support (Eisenberger, Fasolo, & 
Davis-LaMastro, 1990).   
 Settoon et al. (1996) examined the relative contribution of different exchange 
relationships to important employee outcome variables.  Organizational commitment was 
selected as one of the dependent variables in the Settoon et al. (1996) research for several 






with actions on the part of the organization and its representatives that seemingly demand 
reciprocity.  Second, reciprocity, the basis for social exchange, is a mechanism 
underlying commitment.  Finally, employees have been found to view organizational 
commitment as an acceptable commodity for exchange. 
 Research examining the relationship between internal controls and organizational 
commitment is scarce (Argyris, 1985; Koopman, 1991).  Internal controls can help 
synchronize tasks, limit variance in individual behaviors, and increase predictability.  
However, the perception of limiting the autonomy of the individual may have an 
unfavorable effect on his or her commitment to the organization (Koopman, 1991).  
Increasing controls by adding more rules and procedures, can increase the tension 
between control and commitment and may be answered with creative opposition from 
employees (Argyris, 1985; Koopman, 1991).   
 Research in the fields of sociology (Etzioni, 1965) and social psychology 
(Kelman, 1958) has observed that various forms of evaluations and controls can result in 
differing individual levels of commitment to, or alienation from, the organization and its 
objectives.  At one extreme, an internal control that depends heavily on monitoring, 
evaluating, and correcting in an explicit manner is likely to offend an individual’s sense 
of autonomy and self-control.  This could result in an unenthusiastic, purely compliant 
response (Argyris, 1957; Ouchi, 1979).  At the other extreme, Ouchi (1979) emphasizes 
the crucial task of having the right individuals in place.  When individuals share the 
values and goals of the organization, higher levels of commitment can be the result.   
 Social exchange theory proposes that repeated, positive exchanges over time 






businesses (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006) is especially conducive to favorable 
reciprocal exchanges.  These favorable exchanges can produce better working 
relationships and permit individuals to be more committed to, and trusting of, one another 
(Blau, 1964; Molm et al. 2000). 
 Allen & Meyer (1990) identified a model consisting of three distinct dimensions 
of organizational commitment; affective commitment, continuance commitment, and 
normative commitment.  The Allen & Meyer (1990) model has become the dominant 
model for the study of workplace commitment in empirical research (Fu, Bolander, & 
Jones, 2009; S. Jaros, 2007; Sharma & Irving, 2005).   
 More specifically, affective commitment has been the most prevalent approach to 
measuring organizational commitment (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001).  
In extant family business literature the typical usage of the term commitment is consistent 
with the definition of affective commitment (Sharma & Irving, 2005).  Vallejo (2009) 
found that of the three dimensions of the Allen & Meyer (1990) model, the affective 
dimension had the strongest positive effect on the level of identification of nonfamily 
employees in family businesses.  For these reasons, affective commitment is the 
dimension of organizational commitment utilized for this study.   
 Affective commitment is the attachment an individual has to an organization 
based upon identification with the organization and agreement with the goals and values 
of the organization (Allen & Meyer, 1990).  This attachment describes an employee’s 
bond to the organization which includes emotional feelings such as belongingness and 
loyalty (Jaros, Jermier, Koehler, & Sincich, 1993).  Affective commitment is 






decisions, such as to remain with the organization and to participate (Allen & Meyer, 
1990; March & Simon, 1958).  An individual with high levels of affective commitment 
has a strong alignment with the organization’s goals (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Sharma & 
Irving, 2005).  This commitment leads to the belief that the individual feels that his or her 
career aspirations can be satisfied in the context of the organization (Sharma & Irving, 
2005).   
 Zahra et al. (2008) offer several reasons why a strong commitment to the 
business, on the part of employees who are family business members, can create a similar 
affective response among other nonfamily employees.  First, experimental research has 
shown that affect and motivation are contagious within a group, influencing outcomes 
such as cooperation and performance (Barsade, 2002).  Second, the importance of the 
affective commitment and the resulting “tone” of the leader has an important effect on 
subsequent coordination and efforts on behalf of the followers (Sy, Cote, & Saavedra, 
2005).  Lastly, research on employee-organization relationships proposes that the 
strongest influencers of employee affect are the organization’s leaders (Rhoades & 
Eisenberger, 2002), i.e., in family businesses, the founders and owners (Zahra et al. 
2008).   
 Zahra et al. (2008, p. 1038) conclude that “overall these results support the social 
contagion of affect: when one member of a group experiences and behaves in a 
committed fashion, it increases the probability that other group members will also 
experience identity and commitment to the organization.”  The relationship of individuals 
with high levels of affective commitment to the business is perceived as being based on 






Family businesses in particular are characterized by long-term relationships and 
employee loyalty, which are conducive to building affective commitment (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2006; Vallejo, 2008).  Based on these findings, the following hypothesis 
can be formulated: 
H3:  The investment in an IAF is positively related to the measure of  
         affective commitment in privately held family businesses 
Family Business Culture as a Moderating Construct 
Kotter & Heskett (1992) suggest that culture refers to values (what is considered 
important) that are shared by members of a group and tend to persist overtime, even when 
the members of the group change.  Family businesses are in a unique situation of 
combining the culture of the family with the culture of the organization.  For this study, 
organizational culture (the culture of the business) is combined with family culture, to 
form a new construct referred to as family business culture.  Prior to discussing the 
relevance of this newly created construct in the context of an IAF, each of the two 
constituting components are addressed separately in the following sections. 
Organizational Culture 
 Organizational culture has been defined in numerous ways.  However, a common 
theme is that it refers to a system of shared meaning held by organizational members that 
distinguishes the organization from all other organizations (Becker, 1982).  It may be 
viewed as “the pattern of shared values and beliefs that help individuals understand the 
organizational functioning and thus provide them with the norms for behavior in the 
organization” (Deshpande & Webster, 1989, p. 4).  The importance of values in 






which individuals seek a social connection and use this identification to define 
themselves (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).   
 Past research has found that one key element of organizational culture is the 
person-organization fit, in which aspects of both the individual and the situation combine 
to influence an individual’s response to a given situation (O'Reilly, Chatman, & 
Caldwell, 1991).  When people belong to the same organization and share perceptions 
about beliefs and values, they tend to act in similar ways (Sorensen, 2002).  For example, 
characteristics of organizational culture, such as innovation and risk-taking, attention to 
detail, team orientation, stability, and outcome orientation, strongly influence employee 
behaviors (Chatman & Jehn, 1994; O'Reilly et al. 1991).   
 Strong organizational cultures exist when employees and management respond to 
situations because of their alignment with organizational values.  However, the strength 
of organizational cultures being positively related to organizational performance has 
yielded mixed results (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Lee & Yu, 2004; Nemeth, 1997; 
Sorensen, 2002).  Nemeth (1997) suggests that an unanticipated consequence of strong 
organizational culture companies is the stifling of employee creativity and innovation 
through an intense commitment to a set of ideas, a form of groupthink (Janis, 1972, 
1982).  In addition, strong culture firms tend to excel at incremental change levels, but 
encounter difficulties in more volatile environments (Lee & Yu, 2004; Sorensen, 2002).   
 On the other hand, strong organizational cultures can positively affect 
performance by instilling within employees a clear sense of purpose and expectations that 
can result in increased organizational commitment (Deal & Kennedy, 1982).  This 






performance, promotes a high level of commitment to an established way of 
understanding the world, and avoids the costs of disagreement surrounding organizational 
goals and the means to achieve them (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Sorensen, 2002).  Peters & 
Waterman (1982) found that the stronger the culture the less the need for policy manuals, 
organizational charts, or detailed procedures and rules.  “In these companies, people way 
down the line know what they are supposed to do in most situations because the handful 
of guiding values is crystal clear” (Peters & Waterman, 1982, pp. 75-76). 
Family Culture 
   Families vary greatly in their nature, composition, beliefs, and orientations, 
resulting in widely varying family cultures.  Family cultures exert powerful influences 
over what family business members do and how they interpret and respond to 
environmental challenges (Zahra et al. 2008) and serve as the foundation for the culture 
of the family business (Heck, 2004).  Dyer (1988) indicates that the culture found on the 
business side of the family business plays an important role in whether the firm continues 
beyond the first generation.  In addition, family culture has been empirically proven to 
have a significant influence on key strategic decisions of the family business, i.e., 
promoting entrepreneurship and enhancing the distinctiveness of the firm’s products, 
goods, and services (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004).   
 Vallejo (2008) conducted a comparative analysis of the culture of family 
businesses and nonfamily businesses in the automobile distributor sector in Spain.  The 
research results implied that family businesses have a stronger culture based on the fact 
that they have greater organizational commitment, greater organizational harmony, and a 






more closely with the family business create an environment enabling the firm to react 
faster to environmental shifts (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Zahra et al. 2008).   
Family Business Culture and the IAF 
 Prior research has suggested that family businesses perform better because of 
who they are (Denison et al. 2004).  Results have indicated that family businesses have a 
distinct performance enhancing culture (Denison et al. 2004).  “The literature shows 
consistently that family businesses are more value or culture driven, more concerned with 
indoctrination, more apt to be caring of and loyal to their employees, and more 
preoccupied with getting the full potential out of their staff” (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2003, p. 130).  Miller & Le Breton-Miller (2003) continue by suggesting that being 
driven by values or culture helps establish a virtuous circle where employees sense they 
are in a reciprocal, encompassing relationship with the business.  This is an environment 
conducive to positive, long-term exchanges.   
 Research has not been conducted to determine how levels of family culture would 
impact the relationship between a governance mechanism, such as an IAF, and financial 
and nonfinancial outcomes.  However, as the family grows, matures, and experiences 
possible leadership changes, the need for a governance mechanism, such as an IAF, may 
develop.  Employees could perceive the IAF as a method of management providing 
support, reliability, consistency, and known expectations for them in performing their 
responsibilities.  The result could be a positive exchange and either no influence or a 
positive influence on family business outcomes (Coletti et al. 2005).  On the other hand, 
if the employees perceive the IAF as a method of monitoring their work, the control 






undermine the sense of value congruence, and threaten the monitored individual’s sense 
of competence and autonomy (Sitkin & George, 2005).   
 Family business literature argues that the secret of family business can be the 
family culture of the business, which opens communication, streamlines decision making, 
and creates a context of strong, understood norms and values (Chua et al. 2003; 
Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Hoopes & Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2006).  The above research results relating to the uniqueness and importance of family 
business culture leads to the potential that family business culture will moderate the 
proposed relationships as follows: 
H4a:  Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between  
          the investment in an IAF and the objective financial performance of  
          privately held family businesses, such that the positive relationship will 
         weaken as the level of family business culture increases 
H4b:  Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between  
          the investment in an IAF and the subjective financial performance of  
          privately held family businesses, such that the positive relationship will 
          weaken as the level of family business culture increases 
H5a:  Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between  
          the investment in an IAF and trust in the business at privately held  
          family businesses, such that the positive relationship will weaken as the 
          level of family business culture increases 
H5b:  Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between  






           family businesses, such that the positive relationship will weaken as the 
           level of family business culture increases 
H6:    Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between  
           the investment in an IAF and affective commitment at privately held 
           family businesses, such that the positive relationship will weaken as the 
           level of family business culture increases 
 The conceptual model operationalized is presented in Figure 1. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data Collection 
Data were collected for this research via an electronic survey.  The use of surveys 
to gather primary data is consistent with other empirical studies investigating family 
businesses (e.g. Chrisman, Gatewood, & Donlevy, 2002; Eddleston et al. 2008; Schulze 
et al. 2003a).  A pretest of the survey was conducted using family business members of a  
family business center in the southeastern region of the United States.  The pretest was 
used to verify the appropriateness and clarity of the approach and questions contained in 
the survey (Hair, Money, Samouel, & page, 2007).  In addition, the pretest was used to 
determine the appropriate scales for responses based on respondents’ feedback.  The 
electronic survey was completed by the Chief Financial Officer or an individual in an 
equivalent position in a privately held family business that could provide financial and 
business structure information. 
 Privately held family businesses do not have any public disclosure requirements 





























Family Business Culture 
Second-Order Factor Analysis  
a) F-PEC Culture Subscale (15 Items) 
b) Denison Organizational Culture Survey (11 Items) 
Investment in the Internal 
Auditing Function 
Percentage of expenditures for the 
IAF compared to total operating 
expenditures for the last fiscal year 
Objective Financial 
Performance (3 Items) 
 
Subjective Financial 
Performance (7 Items) 
 
Trust in Top Mgt (Shockley-
Zalabak – 6 Items) 
 
Trust in Business (Huff & 
Kelley – 4 Items) 
 
Affective Commitment 
(Meyer & Allen – 4 Items) 
Control Variables:  Firm size, firm age, age of the IAF, education level of the respondent and 
prior work experience with an IAF  











secondary or archival data.  Gathering data from these businesses remains extremely 
challenging due to the importance they place on maintaining their privacy and 
confidentiality (Handler, 1989).  A private research company was determined to be the 
best method of obtaining responses.  Qualtrics (Clear Voice Research) is a market 
research company with census representation to reach hard to source groups.  This 
company and their panel respondents have been used in prior academic research (e.g., 
Strauss, Griffin, & Parker, in press). 
Qualtrics has approximately 540,000 panelists who respond at an average rate of 
20%.  In studies like this one, where the respondent pool was a hard-to-reach segment, 
the company employs partnerships with other companies to obtain the responses.  In 
addition, several checks are in place to confirm the identity of the respondents.  
Verification of postal addresses, flash cookies, and internet protocol (IP) addresses are 
utilized to identify respondents.  The company pulls samples in quota group formats.  
Then simple randomization is used to give a representative sample of new and old 
members within the groups.  Respondents are limited to one completed survey every 10 
days with the research company maintaining full records on panelist activity.  
Respondents receive a cash value reward based on the length of the survey and the target 
audience requested.  The reward is credited to their member account and is available to 
be redeemed in debit cards or gift certificates once his/her account exceeds $10.00. 
Respondents were asked if their business is privately held or publicly traded.  For 
the privately held businesses an analysis was conducted of their responses to the 
questions related to owning family involvement in ownership, in top management, and on 






missing and invalid responses, a sample of 257 respondents was obtained.  The surveys 
were anonymous in the data received from the research company with no information 
linking to the identification of the business or the respondent.   
Demographics 
 Table 1 displays the demographics for the 257 respondents.  The majority of 
respondents were members of the owning family and have education beyond that of high 
school and technical college.  Approximately one half of the businesses (122 of 257) 
have an IAF with the average age of the IAF being 4.44 years.  Forty-one of the 
respondents did not have any experience working with a business with an IAF.  
Additional demographics for all the respondents are presented in Table 1.   
Dependent Variables 
Family Business Outcomes – Financial Performance 
 Consistent with extant family business literature, financial performance was 
measured using both objective and subjective measures (e.g., Daily & Dollinger, 1992; 
Lindow, Stubner, & Wulf, 2010; Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008).  Obtaining at least 
two measures is preferred for several reasons.  First, it is difficult to accurately interpret 
financial performance for privately held family businesses due to potential owner and 
industry specific factors (Westhead & Howorth, 2006).  Second, information must be 
obtained directly from family businesses, which are known to be hesitant to release 
objective performance figures (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Love, Priem, & 
Lumpkin, 2002).  Finally, privately held family businesses often have short-term and 











Panel A – Respondent Demographics             With IAF     Without IAF     Total 
                     (n = 122)       (n = 135)      (n = 257) 
Gender Male 
Female 
         80 
         42 
         65 
         70 
      145 
      112 
 
Family Member Yes 
No 
         92 
         30 
       115 
         20 
      207 
        50 
 
Age (In years) Under 30 
30 – 39 
40 – 49 
50 – 59 
60 and Over 
           0 
         45 
         38 
         24 
         15 
         11 
         27 
         32 
         34 
         31 
        11 
        72 
        70 
        58 
        16 
 




           6 
           9 
         71 
         36 
         21 
         17 
         80 
         17 
        27 
        26 
      151 




         41 
         81 
         20 
       115 
        61 
      196 
 
Number of Years with the 
Business 
     <   5 
  5 – 10 
11 – 15 
     > 16 
         15 
         49 
         28 
         30 
         31 
         40 
         28 
         36 
        46 
        89 
        56 
        66 
 
Number of Years  
experience with  
an IAF (In years) 
None 
  1 – 10 
11 – 20 
21 – 30 
     > 30 
           0 
         63  
         39 
         15 
           5      
         41 
         39 
         34 
         17 
           4 
        41 
      102 
        73 
        32 











Panel B -   Business Demographics    With IAF     Without IAF     Total 







         18 
         44 
         19 
         11 
         14 
         16 
         25 
         46 
         18 
           7 
         12 
         27 
        43 
        90 
        37 
        18 
        26 
        43 
 
Age of the Internal  
Auditing Function 
(In years) 
<    5 
5 – 9 
>    9  
         37 
         38 
         47 
       
 
        37 
        38 
        47 
 






No External Audit 
         22 
         24 
         13 
         22 
         41 
           9 
         11 
           6 
         12 
         97 
        31 
        35 
        19 
        34 
      119 
 
Audit Committee Yes 
No 
         57 
         65 
         12 
       123 
        69 






(Geringer & Herbert, 1991) and may not reflect the achievement of the noneconomic 
goals of the business (Astrachan, 2010).   
 The objective financial performance measures of return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE) and return on sales (ROS) for the last fiscal year were used to measure 
objective financial performance.  These measures are among the most widely used 
financial performance measures for unlisted family businesses (Zellweger & Nason, 
2008).  The respondents were asked to select the appropriate range on a scale of 1 to 12 
with anchors between > - 50% and > 50%.   
 Subjective financial performance was assessed through seven performance related 
questions regarding sales, market share, net income, return on equity, return on assets, the 
ability to fund growth, and overall performance (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007).  For 
each of the seven items, respondents indicated on a 100-point sliding scale anchored by 0 
(Very dissatisfied) and 100 (Very satisfied) their satisfaction with their business’s 
performance for the last fiscal year.  Past research has shown that this method correlates 
with objective financial performance data (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990; Eddleston & 
Kellermanns, 2007; Love et al. 2002; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).   
 The three objective financial indicators and the seven subjective financial 
indicators were totaled in their separate groups to form two overall financial performance 
scores with higher values equating to higher performance (Dess et al. 1990; Eddleston & 
Kellermanns, 2007).   
Family Business Outcomes – Trust 
 Trust was measured at two levels, trust in the business and trust in top 






support an IAF is likely made.  Therefore, the decision to invest in an IAF will likely 
affect the trust in individuals at these levels.  Trust was measured with two established 
and validated scales from prior research (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006).  Overall trust in the 
business was measured utilizing four statements from Huff & Kelley (2003).  A seven-
point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (Strongly disagree) and 7 (Strongly agree) asked 
respondents to indicate the extent to which they disagreed or agreed with the four 
statements.  Cronbach’s alpha for research conducted in the United States with these four 
statements was .83 (Huff & Kelley, 2003).   
 Trust in top management used six statements adapted from Shockley-Zalabak, 
Ellis, & Winograd (2000).  While the original survey instrument used a five-point scale, 
respondents in this study were asked to indicate the extent to which a statement described 
top management based on an eleven-point Likert-type scale anchored by 0 (Strongly 
disagree) and 10 (Strongly agree).  Cronbach’s alpha was .94 in past studies for the 
original five-point scale (Ellis & Shockley-Zalabak, 2001).  Enlarging the range of the 
scale allowed for greater variability and precision of the measurement (Hair et al. 2007).   
Family Business Outcomes – Affective Commitment 
 The Allen & Meyer (1990) Affective Organizational Commitment scale was 
utilized to measure commitment.  Affective commitment has been the most prevalent 
approach to measuring organizational commitment in extant literature (Colquitt et al. 
2001).  In addition, in prior family business literature the typical usage of the term 
commitment is consistent with the definition of affective commitment (Sharma & Irving, 
2005).  The original scale contained eight statements with responses made on a seven-






study, the statements were adapted slightly by reversing two of the four negatively 
worded statements.  Also, one statement was removed because of the possibility of 
causing confusion in the family business setting and two new statements, more applicable 
to the family business setting, were added.  This adaptation resulted in a total of nine 
statements.  The Cronbach’s alpha of the original scale was .87 in prior research.   
Appendix C includes a listing of the scale items and reliabilities for all the dependent 
variables. 
Independent Variable - Investment in an IAF 
 The investment in an IAF was defined as the percentage of dollars expended for 
the IAF compared to total operating expenditures for the last fiscal year.  This categorical 
variable was used in order to analyze the relationship at differing levels of investment in 
the IAF.  Due to the sensitivity of business information for privately held family 
businesses, this question included a range of percentages of expenditures.  This approach 
allowed the businesses to provide the requested data and maintain a certain level of 
confidentiality.  The ranges were determined during the pretest of the survey and 
included seven choices from (1) = < 1 percent to (7) = > 10 percent.   
Moderating Variable - Family Business Culture  
 The 12-item culture subscale of the Family – Power, Experience, Culture (F-PEC) 
scale (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002) was used as one part of the process of 
collecting the data necessary to measure the construct of family business culture.  The F-
PEC culture subscale has been utilized in prior research to assess the extent to which 
family and business values overlap and employees are committed to the business 






statements were measured on a five-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (Not at all) and 
5 (To a large extent) and nine statements were measured on a five-point Likert-type scale 
anchored by 1 (Strongly disagree) and 5 (Strongly agree).  The original scales were 
adapted to an eleven-point Likert-type scale anchored by 0 (Strongly disagree) and 10 
(Strongly agree).  The scales were expanded to increase the variability and precision of 
the measurement (Hair et al. 2007).  One double-barrelled statement was split into two 
statements for a total of 13 statements.  Cronbach’s alpha of .93 from prior research 
suggests sound levels of internal consistency (Klein et al. 2005).    
 The Denison Organizational Culture Survey (Denison et al. 2004) assesses the 
organizational culture of the business in the areas of involvement, consistency, 
adaptability, and mission.  This survey was the starting point for the second measurement 
of culture to be included in the new family business culture construct (Denison et al. 
2004).  The survey is an established, globally recognized measurement of organizational 
culture (Denison, Haaland, & Goelzer, 2003; Denison & Mishra, 1995; Fey & Denison, 
2003; Yilmaz & Ergun, 2008).  In addition, the survey has been used in prior research 
related to recognizing and leveraging the unique strengths of family culture (Denison et 
al. 2004). 
 Although organizational culture has many aspects, the extent to which members 
of a privately held family business have shared goals and values is anticipated to 
moderate the strength of the relationship between the investment in an IAF and family 
business outcomes.  Therefore, for this study the measurement of organizational culture 
focused on two subsets of the Denison Organizational Culture Survey that examines these 






scale was comprised of five items and used a five-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 
(Strongly disagree) and 5 (Strongly agree).  The scale was adapted to a seven-point 
Likert-type scale with the same anchors to allow for greater precision of the measurement 
(Hair et al. 2007).   
 Core Values (subset of Consistency) utilizes five statements to measure the shared 
core values and the ethical code of the family as literature has repeatedly shown that 
family businesses are value or culture driven (e.g. Astrachan et al. 2002; Denison et al. 
2004; Vallejo, 2011).  Three statements were determined to be double-barrelled and were 
revised for purposes of this research.  In addition, one statement from Agreement (subset 
of Consistency), “There is a strong culture” in this organization was included as an 
overall measure of the perception of the strength of the organizational culture.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha for all 15 original statements of the Consistency index, including the 
five statements from the Core Values subset, was .79 in prior research (Denison & 
Mishra, 1995).   
 Goals and Objectives (subset of Mission) includes five statements to examine if 
goals and objectives are understood, agreed upon, and tracked in the business.  Lack of 
understanding or disagreement of the goals of the business and the goals of the family 
can impair the sustainability of the business (Mahto, Davis, Pearce, & Robinson, 2010; 
Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997).  The original 15 statements of the Mission index, 
including the five statements from the Goals and Objectives subset, have exhibited a 








Control Variables  
 Firm Size – Consistent with prior research the characteristic of firm size was 
included as a control variable as larger firms are more apt to have an IAF (e.g., Abdel-
Khalik, 1993; Anderson, Francis, & Stokes, 1993; Carcello et al. 2005; Daily & 
Dollinger, 1992).  Firm size was measured by the natural log of the number of full-time 
employees (Carey et al. 2000; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Mahto et al. 2010).   
  Firm Age (from inception) – Prior research has supported that as firms mature 
and grow, more monitoring processes are often needed (e.g., Carcello et al. 2005; 
Casillas, Moreno, & Barbero, 2010; Chrisman et al. 2004; Schulze et al. 2001).  Firm age 
was measured using the number of years the business has been in existence (Carey et al. 
2000; Lindow et al. 2010; Sorenson, Goodpaster, Hedberg, & Yu, 2009).   
 Age of the IAF – The length of time in years that the IAF has been in operation 
was included in the survey to differentiate between start up IAFs and more mature IAFs.  
As the IAF and the business mature, the IAF may have experienced changes in structure 
or extent.  In addition, recently implemented IAFs may have stronger impacts on 
employee perceptions of family business outcomes than IAFs that have been in place for 
a period of time.   
 Industry – Five categorical variables of retail, service, manufacturing, wholesale, 
and construction were utilized in order to identify the industry sectors in which the 
responding businesses compete.  Respondents were permitted to indicate a category of 
Other that enabled the measurement of the five primary industry categories without over-






2010).  Financial services institutions were excluded from the data analysis since the 
industry is highly regulated and may have compliance risks that mandate an IAF.   
 Education – The higher the level of education of respondents, the more 
understanding, reasoning, and cognitive abilities they should possess, thus significantly 
impacting the way the respondents perceive internal controls, such as an IAF (Hater & 
Bass, 1988).  The highest level of completed formal education was measured using the 
following scale:  (1) high school education, (2) technical college, (3) college graduate, 
and (4) advanced degree (Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010).  
 Prior Work Experience – Respondents with prior work experience at an 
organization with an IAF may consider the function more expected and commonplace.  
Therefore, they may be less impacted than other employees.  Respondents were asked the 
number of years of experience that they have working for an organization with an IAF. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 The means, standard deviations, and correlations of all the variables are displayed 
in Table 2.2  A correlation matrix was used to examine multicollinearity.  Three 
correlations greater than .5 were identified between the dependent variables.  
Multicollinearity would indicate that the independent variables have a substantial amount 
of shared variance (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  This would decrease the 
ability to assess the influence of each independent variable in predicting the dependent  
                                                 
2 Industry was initially included as a control variable.  The regression results revealed it was not significant 






Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Objective Financial Performance (a) 6.74 3.05
2. Subjective Financial Performance (b) 67.50 21.36 .11
3. Trust in the Business 6.13 0.85 .17 ** .34 **
4. Trust in Top Management (c) 9.84 1.69 .19 ** .24 ** .72 **
5. Affective Commitment 6.17 0.73 .22 ** .25 ** .69 ** .65 **
6. Firm Size (d) 2.84 2.64 -.08 .32 ** -.04 -.12 -.09
7. Firm Age 17.49 14.68 -.08 .14 * .03 .04 -.03 .13 *
8. Age of the IAF (e) 4.44 7.37 -.05 .20 ** .04 .04 -.03 .16 * .27 **
9. Education (f) 2.89 0.85 .08 .15 * .01 -.01 .12 .41 ** .13 * .23 *
10. Prior Work Experience with an IAF (g) 11.36 9.56 .01 .08 -.02 .15 * .07 .01 .32 ** .44 ** .08
11. Investment in IAF (h) 1.45 1.91 -.02 .26 ** .07 -.01 .04 .44 ** .11 .43 ** .28 ** .07
12. Family Business Culture (i) 8.02 1.11 .20 ** .31 ** .82 ** .84 ** .71 ** -.09 -.01 .02 .01 .09 .01
n = 257, * = p < .05;  ** = p < .01
Scales are (1) Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree unless otherwise indicated
(a) Scale of (1) > -50% to (12) > 50%
(b) Scale of (0) Very Dissatisfied to (100) Very Satisfied
(c) Scale of (0) Strongly Disagree to (10) Strongly Agree
(d) Full-time Employees (natural log)
(e) In years
(f) (1) High school, (2) Tech college, (3) College, or (4) Advanced
(g) In years
(h) n = 135 with 0 Investment, and n = 122:  (1) < 1% = 32, (2) 1% - 2% = 21, (3) 3% - 4% =14, (4) 5% - 6% = 29, (5) 7% - 8% = 17, 
       (6) 9% - 10% = 8, and (7) > 10% = 1
(i) New construct - See Appendices A and B for more information 
TABLE 2






variable.  The results of the correlation matrix and the fact that the research model has 
one independent variable and will examine the dependent variables separately resulted in 
multicollinearity not presenting a problem.   
Dependent Variables 
 An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted for each of the five 
dependent variables with the following results.  The variables of objective financial  
performance (ά = .94), trust in the business (ά = .80), and trust in top management (ά = 
.98) loaded cleanly into individual factors with the indicated Cronbach’s alpha scores.  
Affective commitment initially loaded into three factors requiring five iterations to result 
in a final single factor (ά = .79).  Appendix C displays the statements used to measure the 
dependent variables, the factor loadings, and Cronbach’s alpha for each item.  
Moderating Variable – Family Business Culture  
 An EFA was also performed on the 26 items of family business culture (15 F-PEC 
items and 11 Denison items) to analyze the correlations among the items.  A VARIMAX 
orthogonal rotation method was used to simplify the columns of the factor analysis and 
give a clear separation of the factors.  Factor loadings were considered significant at .35 
with the sample size of 257 (Hair et al. 2010).  Three iterations of factor analysis resulted 
in the removal of three Denison items. The remaining 23 items loaded into three factors.  
The three factors had communalities at greater than .500, overall and individual item 
measures of sampling adequacy of greater than .500, and 71.93 percent of the variance 
explained.  A Cronbach’s alpha was used as a diagnostic measure to assess the 
consistency of the factors.  Cronbach’s alphas of ά = .95, ά= .95, and ά = .80 were 






 Next, a second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was utilized to develop 
the family business culture construct.  The second-order factor model involves two layers 
of latent constructs where the first-order constructs are viewed as indicators.  
Theoretically, the F-PEC culture subscale items and the sub-sets of culture selected from 
the Denison Organizational Culture Survey items share the same general level of 
abstraction.  Therefore, the first-order model meets the first requirement of theoretical 
justification.  Secondly, the three factors developed in the first-order factor analysis are 
anticipated to influence other related constructs in the same way.  And last, at least three 
first-order constructs can be used in order to meet the minimum conditions for 
identification and good measurement practice (Hair et al. 2010).   
 AMOS 17.0 was used to conduct the second-order factor analysis.  The 
modification indices (Standardized Regression Weights known as factor loadings in 
SPSS) were reviewed and variables with the largest amounts were removed in order to 
improve the model fit.  Seven iterations were completed with an item removed in each 
stage.  The final model consisted of 16 items, had a Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) of .079, a normed Chi-Square (CMIN/DF) of 2.6, and a 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .96 indicating acceptable model fit (Hair et al. 2010).   
 Convergent validity, the extent to which indicators of a construct converge or 
share variance, was tested by assessing the loading estimates.  Three loadings, 
Standardized Regression Weights, did have amounts slightly below the .70 recommended 
amount, but were still above the .50 acceptable amount (Hair et al. 2010).  Internal 
reliability was verified by a Cronbach’s alpha of ά= .94.  Appendix A displays the final 






that refer to the complete Statements in the Statement # column in Appendix B.  For 
example, box S23_3 on Appendix A refers to S23_3 in the Statement # column of 
Appendix B.   
 Appendix B includes (1) the original scale statements, (2) the revised statements 
that were included in this survey, (3) the iterations completed in the EFA and second-
order CFA, and (4) the final loadings.   
   The average summated score was calculated for the remaining 16 items of the 
family business culture construct, resulting in an average level of family business culture 
for each respondent.   
Hypotheses Tests 
 The conceptual model includes one nominal independent variable, one interval 
moderator variable, five control variables and five interval dependent variables.  This 
structure indicates that multiple regression is the appropriate statistical tool (Hair et al. 
2010).  A test of skewness revealed that the average summated scale of family business 
culture was negatively skewed.  The variable was reflected by subtracting every 
observation from the largest value of the variable plus one.  The square root of each 
observation was then calculated to achieve an acceptable level of skewness.     
 The moderating variable of family business culture was centered by subtracting 
the mean from each observed data point.  This shifts the scale and is beneficial in 
calculating the interaction term.  Centering reduces the correlation with the original 
variables and helps interpretation of the regression coefficients.  Centering the continuous 






 The five dependent variables were tested separately as the objective was to 
examine the individual relationships between the independent variable and each 
dependent variable, including any moderating influence.  The results for each of the five 
dependent variable models are displayed in the following tables.  The moderation effect 
of family business culture was tested consistent with the approach outlined by Cohen & 
Cohen (1983) and Baron & Kenny (1986).  
 Model 1 of each table includes the results of testing the control variables, Model 2 
includes the results for the main effects hypotheses tests, Model 3 displays the results for 
the moderation and related hypotheses, and Model 4 includes all the variables and the 
interaction term.     
 Table 3 indicates that the control variable of education level is significantly 
related to objective financial performance (β = .52, p < .05).  However, Hypothesis 1a is 
not supported as the investment in an IAF was excluded from the model by the regression 
analysis.  Family business culture is statistically significant at β = 1.70, p < .01, and the 
overall model remains significant at F = 2.65, p < .05.  However, the interaction term is 
not significant indicating no moderating effect and lack of support for Hypothesis 4a. 
 The results for subjective financial performance are included in Table 4.  Firm 
size and the age of the IAF are significant control variables, but once again the main 
effect, Hypothesis 2b, was excluded from the regression model and not supported.  The 
moderator and interaction results are similar to objective financial performance and do 







Regression Analysis - Objective Financial Performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    Model 4
Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees) -.15 -.15 -.11 -.12
Firm Age -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02
Age of the IAF -.03 -.03 -.02 -.03
Education of the Respondent .55 * .55 * .52 * .52 *
Prior Work Experience with an IAF .02 .02 .01 .01
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3:  Moderator
Family Business Culture 1.71 ** 1.70 **
Model 4:  Interaction 
Family Business Culture x $ IAF .01
R² .03 .03 .07 .07
Adjusted R² .01 .01 .05 .04
F 1.70 1.70 3.10 ** 2.65 *
n = 257, * = p < .05;  ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficent betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables 
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)








Regression Analysis - Subjective Financial Performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees) 2.40 *** 2.40 *** 2.80 *** 2.80 ***
Firm Age .10 .10 .12 .12
Age of the IAF .40 * .40 * .41 * .41 *
Education of the Respondent -3.71 -3.71 -.71 -.71
Prior Work Experience with an IAF -.01 -.01 -.10 -.10
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3:  Moderator
Family Business Culture 21.96 *** 21.96 ***
Model 4:  Interaction 
Family Business Culture x $ IAF 
R² .13 .13 .25 .25
Adjusted R² .11 .11 .24 .24
F 7.51 *** 7.51 *** 14.12 *** 14.12 ***
n = 257, * = p < .05;  ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficient betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)







 Tables 5 through 73 display similar results for the remaining three dependent 
variables of trust in the business, trust in top management, and affective commitment.  
The overall models are significant at F = 80.26, p < .001, F = 82.67, p < .001, and F = 
50.16, p < .001, respectively, and the moderator of family business culture is significant 
in all three models.  However, the main effect of Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 3 and the 
moderation Hypotheses of 5a, 5b, and 6 are not supported.  
 An additional analysis was conducted to test for significant differences between 
the means of the groups with an IAF (n = 122) and without an IAF (n = 135).  A one-way 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed higher means for the respondents with an IAF 
for all the dependent variables.   
 An analysis was also performed utilizing the independent variable of Yes = 1 
having an IAF and 0 otherwise.  Using this dichotomous independent variable resulted in 
a statistically significant relationship between having an IAF and objective performance 
(β = 1.02, p < .05) and having an IAF and subjective performance (β = 6.44, p < .05).  
The interaction, once again, was not significant.  In addition, the 122 business with an 
IAF were separated from the full sample and the regression was run on just those 
businesses with an IAF.  The results did not reveal any statistical differences.   
 As a final test, the age of the IAF was divided into three dummy variables of (1) 
less than 5 years, (2) between 5 and 9 years, and (3) more than 9 years.  A one-way 
ANOVA was used to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between 
the means of the three groups.  The businesses with an IAF in place for 5 to 9 years had  
                                                 
3 To analyze trust in top management the percentage of top management positions currently occupied by 







Regression Analysis - Trust in the Business
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees) -.02 -.02 .02 .01
Firm Age .00 .00 .00 .00
Age of the IAF .01 .01 .01 .01
Education of the Respondent .02 .02 -.02 -.02
Prior Work Experience with an IAF -.01 -.01 -.01 *** -.01 ***
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3:  Moderator
Family Business Culture 2.07 *** 2.07 ***
Model 4:  Interaction 
Family Business Culture x $ IAF .02
R² .01 .01 .69 .69
Adjusted R² -.01 -.01 .68 .68
F .36 .36 93.46 *** 80.26 ***
n = 257, * = p < .05;  ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficient betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables 
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)







Regression Analysis - Trust in Top Management
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees) -.09 -.09 -.02 -.02
Firm Age .00 .00 .00 .00
Age of the IAF .00 .00 .00 .00
Education of the Respondent .07 .07 .01 .01
Prior Work Experience with an IAF .03 * .03 * .01 .01
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3:  Moderator
Family Business Culture 3.92 *** 3.92 ***
Model 4:  Interaction 
Family Business Culture x $ IAF 
R² .04 .04 .67 .67
Adjusted R² .02 .02 .66 .66
F 1.96 1.96 82.67 *** 82.67 ***
n = 257, * = p < 0.05;  ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficient betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)






Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees) -.04 * -.04 * -.01 -.01
Firm Age .00 .00 .00 .00
Age of the IAF -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01
Education of the Respondent .17 ** .17 ** .14 ** .14 **
Prior Work Experience with an IAF .01 .01 .00 .00
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3:  Moderator
Family Business Culture 1.52 *** 1.52 ***
Model 4:  Interaction 
Family Business Culture x $ IAF 
R² .05 .05 .55 .55
Adjusted R² .03 .03 .54 .54
F 2.40 * 2.40 * 50.16 *** 50.16 ***
n = 257, * = p < .05;  ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficient betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables 
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)
(2) Refer to Table 2 for complete variable descriptions
TABLE 7






the greater mean for all the dependent variables except subjective financial performance.  
Group 3, businesses with an IAF of more than 9 years had the lowest means except in the 
areas of subjective financial performance and trust in top management.   
Additional Sensitivity Tests 
 Tests of normality, skewness, and kurtosis revealed acceptable ranges other than 
the negative skewness of family business culture that was mentioned earlier.  The 
influence of outliers was determined by standardizing the scores of the variables.  The 
standard scores were calculated by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard  
deviation for each variable (Hair et al. 2010).  Six observations were identified that 
exceeded the threshold value of 4 for larger sample sizes (n= > 80).  The six observations 
were excluded and the regression models were rerun.  Outliers were not considered to 
impact the results as the coefficient amounts had minor adjustments with no changes to 
overall results or significance. 
 The design of the survey tool and statistical procedures were used to control for 
common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003).  
Although, the independent and dependent variables were collected from a single 
respondent, the independent variable was reported as a range of percentages of 
expenditures and was less open to perception bias.  In addition, the measurement 
statements for the moderating variable and the dependent variables were from established 
validated scales.  The scales were adapted slightly to eliminate vague, double-barrelled, 
or outdated statements or terms.  The endpoints and anchoring effects were extended to 






2010).  For example, Likert-type scales were used with anchors of 1 to 7 and 0 to 10.  
Sliding scales were also used with anchors of 0 to 100.     
 Common methods bias was also tested by entering the independent, dependent, 
and moderator variables in a factor analysis (Podsakoff et al. 2003).  Three factors were 
extracted with eigenvalues > 1.0 and a total of 59.76 percent of the total variance 
explained.  The first variable accounted for 28.42 percent, the second variable 16.96 
percent, and the third 14.39 percent of the total variance explained.   The factors loaded 
cleanly and no single factor accounted for the majority of the variance indicating that 
common method bias was not considered to be an issue. 
DISCUSSION 
Findings and Implications 
 Research related to the outcomes of an IAF has been limited to date.  This is 
especially true in the area of privately held family businesses.  Unlike their publicly 
traded competitors, privately held family businesses are not bound by mandatory 
reporting or auditing procedures.  Even without a requirement to do so, some privately 
held family businesses invest at differing levels in an IAF.  This research takes the first 
step in examining the outcomes of that investment.   
 Prior research suggests that some family businesses derive a competitive 
advantage due their high levels of trust and organizational commitment (Eddleston et al. 
2010; Vallejo, 2009).  Research has indicated that family businesses often rely on trust 
and organizational commitment as substitutes for other governance mechanisms, such as 






can establish expectations, reliability, predictability and an environment conductive to a 
beneficial exchange between employees and the business.  The other side of the issue 
suggests that if applied inappropriately the IAF can imply distrust and the need to 
monitor. 
 The new construct of family business culture developed in this study is a 
replicable measure of the influence of the combined cultures of the family and of the 
business interacting within the business.  The new construct has an internal reliability 
score in the excellent range and provides a new method of measurement to conduct 
research of family and business dynamics across family businesses.  In addition, the new 
construct of family business culture was a strong influence in all the models, but was not 
significant as a moderating variable.   
 The results of this study reflect that the level of investment in IAF does not have a 
significant influence on the outcomes of objective financial performance, subjective 
financial performance, trust in the business, trust in top management, or affective 
commitment.   
Limitations and Future Research   
 The survey was designed, and statistical tests conducted, to manage the issue of 
common method bias.  However, the fact that survey data was gathered from a single 
respondent is identified as a limitation of the study.  The respondent needed to be 
someone at a level to provide the financial information concerning the dollar investment 
in an IAF and also the ranges of the three objective financial performance variables.  
While this was the appropriate person for the financial information, the respondent could 






respondents from the same firm, at different organization levels and in different 
responsibility areas could provide a more robust analysis in future research.   
 In addition, future research is needed to examine and validate the new construct of 
family business culture.  Although the construct did not reach the significance level in 
this study related to the IAF, there are numerous opportunities to test the construct in 
areas outside of governance mechanisms.  The construct provides a measurement tool 
that could be used to revisit prior research that has produced conflicting results.  Research 
in areas that have the potential to be influenced by variations in goals, core values, and 
relationships could be prime beneficiaries of the construct.   
 Although the expected results were not obtained, this study has taken a first step 
at examining the outcomes of the IAF in privately held family businesses.  Prior research 
has indicated that trust and affective commitment can create a competitive advantage for 
family businesses.  Therefore, identifying business processes and/or governance 
mechanisms that can increase objective and subjective performance, and have a positive 
impact on trust and affective commitment, could provide critical information to owners 
and management.  These businesses remain the predominant form of business structure in 
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APPENDIX A - Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for  
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APPENDIX B - Developing the Family Business Culture Construct 
 
           Original Statements          Statement #    Revised Statements                  EFA                CFA           Loadings 
    See Appendix A 
Denison Organizational 
Culture 
 In this business…….    
The leaders and 
managers “practice 
what they preach” 
S20 Top management 
practices what they 
preach 
  .768 
There is a characteristic 
management style and a 
distinct set of 
management practices 
S15 There is a distinct set of 
management practices 
(Double barrelled was 
revised) 
 Removed 
in Step 7 
 
There is a clear and 
consistent set of values 
that govern the way we 
do business 
S26 There is a clear set of 
values that governs the 
way we do business 
  .873 
Ignoring core values 
will get you in trouble 
S42 Ignoring core values 
will get you in trouble 
Removed 
in Step 1 
  
There is an ethical code 
that guides our behavior 
and tells us right from 
wrong 
S21 There is an ethical code 
that guides our behavior 
and tells us right from 
wrong 
  .876 
There is widespread 
agreement about goals 
S32 There is widespread 
agreement about goals 
Removed 
in Step 2 
  
Leaders set goals that 
are ambitious, but 
realistic 
S41 Top management sets 
goals that are 
ambitious, but realistic 
  .620 
The leadership has 
“gone on the record” 
about the objective we 
are trying to meet 
S47 Top management has 
gone on record about 
the objectives we are 
trying to meet  
  .573 
We continuously track 
our progress against our 
stated goals 
S17 We continuously track 
our progress against 
stated goals 
 Removed 
in Step 1 
 
People understand what 
needs to be done for us 
to succeed in the long 
run 
S16 People understand what 
needs to be done we 
can succeed in the long 
run 
 Removed 
in Step 6 
 
There is a “strong” 
culture 
S31 There is a strong culture 
in this business 
Removed 








APPENDIX B - Developing the Family Business Culture Construct (continued) 
 
    Original Statements                 Statement #     Revised Statements                  EFA               CFA           Loadings 
F-PEC- Culture      
Your family has 
influence on your 
business 
S28_4 The owning family has 
a strong influence on 
the business 
  .790 
Your family and 
business share similar 
values 
S18_3 The owning family 
members and the 
business share similar 
values 
  .877 
Your family members 
share similar values 
S23_6 The owning family 
members share similar 
values 
  .891 
Family members 
support the family 
business in discussions 
with friends, 
employees, and other 
family members 
S18_9 Employees support the 
family business in 
discussions with others 
  .858 
Family members feel 
loyalty to the family 
business 
S23_2 Employees feel loyalty 
to the family business 
  .938 
Family members are 
proud to tell others that 
we are part of the 
family business 
S23_4 Employees are proud to 
tell others that they are 
part of the family 
business 
  .860 
There is so much to be 
gained by participating 
with the family 
business on a long-term 
basis 
S23_1 There is much to be 
gained by participating 
with the family 
business on a long-term 
basis 
  .799 
Family members agree 
with the family 




Employees agree with 
the family business 
plans 
 Removed 
in Step 2 
 
Triple Barrelled 
statement above was 
divided into 3 separate 
statements.  
S18_1 Employees agree with 
the family business 
policies 
 Removed 
in Step 4 
 
 S23_5 Employees agree with 
the family business 
goals 
 Removed 







APPENDIX B - Developing the Family Business Culture Construct (continued) 
 
    Original Statements                 Statement #     Revised Statements                  EFA               CFA           Loadings 
Family members really 
care about the fate of 
the family business 
S18_2 Employees really care 
about the fate of the 
family business 
  .584 
Deciding to be involved 
with the family 
business has a positive 
influence on my life 
S18_4 Deciding to be involved 
with the family 
business has a positive 
influence on my life 
  .832 
I understand and 
support my family’s 
decisions regarding the 
future of the family 
business 
S18_8 I understand the owning 
family’s decisions 
regarding the future of 
the family business 
 Removed 
in Step 5 
 
Double Barrelled 
statement above was 
divided into 2 separate 
statements. 
S23_3 I support the owning 
family’s decisions 
regarding the future of 
the family business 
  .938 
Family members are 
willing to put in a great 
deal of effort beyond 
that normally expected 
to help the family 
business be successful 
S28_1 Employees are willing 
to put in a great deal of 
effort beyond that 
normally expected to 
help the family business 
be successful 
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APPENDIX C - Scale Items and Reliabilities 
 
Construct   Items           Loadings          ά    
  
 
Objective Performance 12 point scale = > (50%) to > 50%       .94  
    Return on Assets    .969  
    Return on Equity    .949 
    Return on Sales    .916 
     
Subjective Performance Sliding Scale = 0 to 100       .94  
    Sales      .847  
  
    Market Share     .813 
    Net Income     .893 
    Return on Equity    .901 
    Return on Assets    .895 
    The Ability to Fund Growth   .850 
    Overall Performance    .741 
 
Trust in the Business   7 point scale          .80 
    In this business managers trust their   .660 
    subordinates to make good decisions 
 
    In this business if someone makes a   .857 
    promise, others within the business  
    will almost always trust that the  
    person  will do his or her best to keep  
    the promise 
 
    There is a very high level of trust   .831 
    throughout this business 
 
    In this business subordinates have a   .861 
    great deal of trust for managers 
 
Trust in Top Management: 11 point scale         .98 
    In your opinion, top management: 
    Is sincere in their efforts to communicate  .946 
    with employees 
    Listens to employees’ concerns  .943 
    Keeps their commitments to employees .964 
    Is concerned about employees’ well being .949 
    Keeps their word to employees  .969 






APPENDIX C – Scale Items and Reliabilities (continued) 
 
Construct   Items           Loadings          ά    
  
 
Affective Commitment 7 point scale          .79 
    This business has a great deal of  .642  
    personal meaning for me 
 
    I really feel as if this business’s  .817 
    problems are my own 
 
    I would be happy to spend the rest  .783 
    of my career with this business 
 
    I feel emotionally attached to   .888 
    this business 
 
     
 




















Enhancing Family Business Success Survey 
(Adapted from the Qualtrics electronic survey tool) 
 
Q1 Dear Family Business Associate, Your responses to this brief, confidential survey will 
provide valuable information for your owners and managers to consider when looking for 
options to improve the success of the business.  This research will provide previously 
unavailable information that can be used by your business as a benchmark when 
assessing future changes.  The Chief Financial Officer (or similarly titled position that 
can provide ownership structure and process information) should complete the survey.  
The estimated time for completion of the Chief Financial Officer survey is 20 to 25.  
When answering questions containing the terms 'we' or 'our' please assume you are taking 
the perspective of the employees in the company.   If you are interrupted and need to step 
away, just close the survey.  When you click the link to reopen the survey, the survey will 
open at the question you were answering.   The research is completely confidential.  
Individual and business names will not be maintained, nor released, at any point.  Thank 
you for your participation!   Your responses by December 15, 2011 are greatly 
appreciated!   
Q2 Note - Your participation is voluntary and may be withdrawn without penalty.  The 
research has no risks to the respondents.  By completing this survey you are agreeing to 
participation in the research process.  Research at Kennesaw State University that 
involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional Review 
Board.   
Q3 Note - Question or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to Dr. 
Christine Ziegler, Chairperson of the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State 
University, 1000 Chastain Road, #2202, Kennesaw, GA 30144, (770) 423-6407.) 
Q4 What is your gender?  
 Male   
 Female 
Q5 How many years have you been with this business? 
Q6 Are you a member of the owning family?  (Family member is defined as offspring of 









Q7 Which of the following best describes your relationship? 
 Founder 
 Descendent of Founder 
 In-law 
 Legally Adopted 
 Other - Please specify ____________________ 






Q9 What is your position in the business?  (Please check all that apply.)   
 Owner 
 Chairman 
 Board Member 
 President 
 Chief Executive Officer 
 Chief Operating Officer 




 Internal Auditor 







Q10 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your 
personal opinion of your business environment: 
Q11 I believe in this business: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q12 This business has a great deal of personal meaning for me: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q13 In this business managers trust their subordinates to make good decisions: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 







Q14 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your 
personal opinion of your business environment: 
Q15 In this business there is a distinct set of management practices: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q16 In this business people understand what needs to be done so we can succeed in the 
long run: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q17 In this business we continuously track our progress against stated goals: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 







Q18    In your opinion, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following 
statements:  
Strongly Disagree  
= 0 
Strongly Agree  
= 1 





























   
10 
Employees agree 
with the family 
business policies 
                      
Employees really 
care about the fate of 
the family business 
                      
The owning family 
members and the 
business share 
similar values 
                      
Deciding to be 
involved with the 
family business has a 
positive influence on 
my life 
                      
I understand the 
owning family's 
decisions regarding 
the future of the 
family business 
                      
Employees support 
the family business 
in discussions with 
others 
                      
 






Q19 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your 
personal opinion of your business environment: 
Q20 In this business top management “practices what they preach”: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q21 In this business there is an ethical code that guides our behavior and tells us right 
from wrong: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q22 I believe in the mission of the business: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 







Q23    In your opinion, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following 
statements:         

































There is much to be 
gained by 
participating with 
the family business 
on a long-term basis 
                      
Employees feel 
loyalty to the family 
business 
                      
I support the owning 
family's decisions 
regarding the future 
of the family 
business 
                      
Employees are 
proud to tell others 
that they are part of 
the family business 
                      
Employees agree 
with the family 
business goals 
                      
The owning family 
members share 
similar values 







Q24 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your 
personal opinion of your business environment: 
Q25 In this business if someone makes a promise, others within the business will almost 
always trust that the person will do his or her best to keep the promise: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q26 In this business there is a clear set of values that governs the way we do business: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q27 I really feel as if this business’s problems are my own: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 







Q28    In your opinion, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following 
statements: 


































willing to put in a 
great deal of effort 
beyond that 
normally expected 
to help the family 
business be 
successful 
                      
Employees agree 
with the family 
business plans 
                      




future of the 
family business 
                      
The owning 
family has a 
strong influence 
on the business 







Q29 In your opinion, please rate the extent to which the following factors influence your 
commitment to the business: (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the 
scale. Not moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.) 
______ Family Members of the Business 
______ Business Goals 
______ Personal Goals 
______ Values of the Business 
______ Personal Values 
 
Q30 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your 
personal opinion of your business environment: 
Q31 There is a “strong” culture in this business: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q32 In this business there is widespread agreement about goals: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q33 I think that I could easily become as attached to another business as I am to this one: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 






Q34 Please indicate your satisfaction with the business’s performance in the following 
areas for the Last Fiscal Year.  (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the 
scale.  Not moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.) 
______ Sales 
______ Market Share 
______ Net Income 
______ Return on Equity 
______ Return on Assets 
______ The Ability to Fund Growth 







Q35 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your 
personal opinion of your business environment: 
Q36 I enjoy discussing the business with people outside of the business: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q37 I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to the business: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q38 There is a very high level of trust throughout this business: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 







Q39   In your opinion, indicate the extent to which the following statements describe top 
management within your family business:          
Strongly Disagree 
= 0 































































                      
Top management 
keeps their word 
to employees 
                      
Top management 







Q40 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your 
personal opinion of your business environment.  
Q41 In this business top management sets goals that are ambitious, but realistic: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q42 In this business ignoring core values will get you in trouble: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q43 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this business: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 







Q44 Please place a 1 for Most Important, 2 for Second Most Important, and 3 for Third 
Most Important in the boxes provided below to indicate the top 3 items of importance, to 
you personally, for the business to accomplish: 
______ Financial Performance 
______ Employment of Family Members 
______ Family Satisfaction 
______ Family Independence 
______ Respect of the Business in the Community 
______ Write-in 
______ Write-in 
Q45 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your 
personal opinion of your business environment: 
Q46 In this business subordinates have a great deal of trust for managers: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q47 In this business top management has “gone on record” about the objectives we are 
trying to meet: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
Q48 I feel “emotionally attached” to this business: 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Agree 






Q49 How many years experience do you have working for an organization with an 
Internal Auditing Function? 
Q50 What is your age? 
Q51 Please indicate your highest completed level of formal education: 
 High School 
 Tech College 
 College 
 Advanced 
Q52 Are you the Chief Financial Officer (or a position having similar responsibilities) 
that would be the appropriate person to provide information on the ownership structure 
and performance of the business? 
 Yes 
 No 
Q53 Please supply the following basic information: 
What year was the business established? 
Current number of full-time employees 
Q54 The business is: 
 Privately Held 
 Publically Traded 






 Other - Please specify ____________________ 
Q56 What is the total number of top management positions in your business? 
Q57 How many top management positions in the business are currently occupied by 
family members?   (Family member is defined as offspring of a couple, no matter what 






Q58   Please provide the following information concerning the structure of the business.    
Please indicate the proportion of share ownership held by family members and non-
family members:  (The total must equal 100%.)    (Family is defined as a group of 
persons including those who are either offspring of a couple, no matter what generation, 




















    
 
Q59 Please indicate the percentages of ownership of the 5 largest owners:   (If you do not 
know exact percentages, please estimate.) 
 Percentage of Ownership 
Largest Owner  
Second Largest Owner  
Third Largest Owner  
Fourth Largest Owner  
Fifth Largest Owner  
 
Q60   Please check all boxes that apply: 




owns the business?         
  
Which generation(s) 








Q61 Does the business have a Board of Directors/Advisory Board? 
 Yes 
 No 
Q62   Please provide the following information concerning members of the Board of 
Directors/Advisory Board at this business:     (Independent is defined as nonfamily, 
nonemployee, and no business relationship with your business.)     (Family member is 
defined as offspring of a couple, no matter what generation, their in-laws, and any legally 
adopted children.)     
______ Number of Family Members 
______ Number of Independent Members 
Q63 How many members of the Board of Directors/Advisory Board are Female? 
 
Q64   Please check all boxes that apply: 




serve(s) on the Board of 
Directors? 
          
 
Q65 How would you rate the Board of Directors/Advisory Board’s level of contribution 
to the business’s success?   (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the 
scale.  Not moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.) 
______ Level of Contribution  
Q66 Does the business have an Audit Committee? 
 Yes 
 No 








Q69 Please check all boxes 
that apply: 




Which generation(s) serve(s) 
on the Audit Committee         
  
 
Q70 How would you rate the Audit Committee’s level of contribution to the business’s 
success?   (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the scale.  Not moving 
the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.) 
______ Level of Contribution 













Q73 Does your business have an Internal Auditing Function? 
 Yes 
 No 
Q74 How long has the Internal Auditing Function been in place?   (Please write in the 
number of years.) 









 Board of Directors 
 Audit Committee 
 Other - Please specify ____________________ 
Q76 What percentage of the Internal Auditing Function work is performed internally or 
outsourced?  (The total must equal 100%.) 
______ Internally 
______ Outsourced 
Q77 For the percentage of the Internal Auditing Function work that is performed 
internally, please indicate the number of internal staff in the Internal Auditing Function: 
Q78 For the percentage of the Internal Auditing Function work that is performed 
internally, how many of the Internal Auditing Function staff members are family 
members?   (Family member is defined as offspring of a couple, no matter what 
generation, their in-laws, and any legally adopted children.) 
Q79 Please indicate the dollar amount expended for the Internal Auditing Function as a 
percentage of total operating expenditures for the Last Fiscal Year: 
 < 1% 
 1% - 2% 
 3% - 4% 
 5% - 6% 
 7% - 8% 
 9% - 10% 
 > 10% 
Q80 For each of the following, select the one description that is most similar to your 
Internal Auditing Function: 
Q81 The style of our Internal Auditing Function would be described by our stakeholders 
as: 
 Corporate police 
 Supportive 
 Advisor 
Q82 The perspective of our Internal Auditing Function is focused primarily on the: 
 Past (retrospective look at what happened) 
 Present 







Q83 The responsibility of our Internal Auditing Function is to: 
 Audit for compliance 
 Audit and suggest 
 Audit and consult 
Q84 How would you rate the Internal Auditing Function’s level of contribution to the 
business’s success?  (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the scale.  
Not moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.) 
______ Level of Contribution 
Q85 How likely is the business to implement an Internal Auditing Function within the 
next 5 years?  (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the scale.  Not 
moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.) 
______ Likelihood of Implementing an Internal Auditing Function within the next 5 
years 
Q86 How many adult family members participate actively in the business?  (Participate 
actively is defined as serves on the board, works in the business, and/or attends the 
majority of meetings held by the business.)  
Q87 How many family members do not participate actively in the business but are 
interested? 















Q89 Please check one box for each performance item to indicate the appropriate range (in    













































            
Return 
on Sales 
            
 
Q90 Please indicate if you are a licensed Certified Public Accountant? 
 Yes 
 No 
Q91 Is your business a member of a Family Business Center at a college or university? 
 Yes 
 No 
Q92     All the responses from your business are greatly appreciated!  Please click the 
next arrow one final time to submit your completed survey. 
